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Funding Discipline for U.S. Public 
Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of 
Institutional Design 
Natalya Shnitser 
ABSTRACT: Using newly collected data on over 100 state-administered 
pension plans, this Article shows that previously overlooked differences in 
institutional design are associated with the striking variation in funding 
discipline across U.S. public pension plans. As state and local governments 
grapple with unfunded pension obligations, this Article presents a timely 
examination of public plan governance across two key dimensions: the 
allocation of control over funding decisions and the transparency with respect 
to funding liabilities. It shows empirically that greater constraints on 
legislative control over funding decisions—typically through the delegation of 
control to pension-system boards—have been associated with better funding 
discipline. Conversely, liability-pooling arrangements that have shrouded 
individual employer responsibility for underfunding have been associated 
with worse funding discipline. These findings should inform current reform 
efforts to address the multi-trillion dollar shortfall in pension funding. To 
date, such state and local government efforts have focused primarily on 
scaling back benefits for public employees but have overlooked the role of 
institutions in explaining why some public employers have consistently 
contributed to the pension funds while others have failed to set adequate 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the underfunding of public pension plans across the 
United States—totaling between $1 and $3 trillion dollars in the aggregate1—
has contributed to ballooning budget deficits, municipal bankruptcies,2 and 
increasingly dramatic calls for public pension reform.3 The lack of funding 
discipline on the part of some public employers, as measured by the failure of 
such employers to meet the annual contribution benchmarks recommended 
by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”), has been a 
significant culprit.4 Despite the widespread consensus that meeting these 
benchmark contribution targets is essential for the responsible management 
of long-term pension liabilities, U.S. public employers have exhibited 
tremendous variation in funding discipline, with some consistently making 
the recommended pension payments but others habitually skipping or 
underpaying the target contributions. 
Using newly collected data on 110 state-administered public pension 
plans, this Article shows that previously overlooked differences in plan-level 
 
 1. Joshua Rauh, The Pension Bomb, MILKEN INST. REV., Jan. 2011, at 28, 32, available at 
http://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/MIReview/PDF/26-37.mr49.pdf. See generally 
ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., THE FUNDING OF STATE AND LOCAL 
PENSIONS: 2012–2016 (2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/slp_32-
508.pdf. 
 2. In recent years, a number of municipalities, including Vallejo, California, in 2008, 
Central Falls, Rhode Island, in 2011, Stockton, California, and Mammoth Lakes, California, in 
2012, and Detroit, Michigan, in 2013, have filed for bankruptcy in part due to the burden of 
pension obligations. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles 
into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-
files-for-bankruptcy.html; Elizabeth Trotta, Stockton Teeters on Bankruptcy Edge, but City’s Not Alone, 
THE EXCHANGE (June 27, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/ 
stockton-teeters-bankruptcy-edge-city-not-alone-190026487.html. 
 3. In the same period, most states scaled back pensions for new employees, and a number 
of states reduced pension obligations to current employees and retirees. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 
SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY 21 (2012), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/590/589043.pdf; see also John W. Schoen, Pandemic of Pension Woes Is Plaguing the 
Nation, CNBC (Nov. 19, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100929269; Christine 
Williamson, Motor City as a Motivator: Detroit’s Woes Seen Likely to Push Others to Resolve Their Pension 
Underfunding, PENSIONS & INVS. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.pionline.com/article/20130805/ 
PRINT/130809965/motor-city-as-a-motivator. In July of 2013, Senator Hatch proposed “a way 
for states and cities to exit the pension business.” Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Proposal Aims to Ease 
Burden on States and Cities, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/09/pension-proposal-aims-to-ease-burden-on-states-and-cities. Under the proposal, local 
governments would hold annual auctions to purchase annuity contracts for their employees. In the 
course of the working years, an employee would collect a series of annuity contracts that, in the 
aggregate, would substitute for a pension. The public employer’s liability would consist only of the 
upfront payment to the insurer. Id. 
 4. The GASB is a private, not-for-profit entity that sets standards for accounting and financial 
reporting by state and local governments. Facts About GASB, GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http:// 
www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage&cid=1176163065939 (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2014). 
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institutional design are associated with the variation in funding discipline. 
The analysis exploits the lack of federal regulation for public plans, which has 
left the governance of such plans to highly variable, plan-specific rules. Across 
the plans examined in this Article, there are significant differences in the 
employees and employers covered, the composition of the governing system 
boards, the control afforded to the state legislatures, the allocation and 
disclosure of liabilities, and even the statutory and constitutional constraints 
on pension funding. Such variation presents a unique opportunity to study 
how different public employers have managed long-term liabilities and how 
legal institutions have been used to constrain the inherent principle–agent 
problems and the tendency of political actors “to prefer the present to the 
future.”5 
The focus of the analysis in this Article is on institutional variation across 
two key dimensions: the allocation of control over funding decisions and the 
transparency with respect to funding liabilities. The results of the empirical 
analysis indicate that greater delegation of control over funding decisions to 
pension system boards has been associated with better funding discipline. 
Conversely, the widely adopted “cost-sharing” arrangements that have 
permitted municipal and state employers to pool assets and liabilities without 
delineating responsibility for underfunded pools, in conjunction with lax 
disclosure requirements, have been associated with worse funding discipline. 
Thus, even though all U.S. public pension plans can be characterized by 
political promises of future benefits and powerful incentives to shirk on 
current funding for such promises, institutions that facilitate transparency 
and pre-commitment to actuarially determined funding policies may  mitigate 
the shifting of current pension costs to future taxpayers. 
This study of plan-level decision-making fills an important gap in the 
scholarship on U.S. public pension plans. While prior research has identified 
the tremendous funding challenges faced by many public pension plans in 
the U.S. and has explored the legal ramifications of changes to benefits 
promised to retirees and current employees, the analysis of funding discipline 
at the employer level has been “embryonic.”6 Most of the analyses to date, as 
well as the policy recommendations based on these analyses, have taken state-
level snapshots of the pension funding data. By aggregating financial 
information about different pension plans within states, such analyses have 
overlooked important in-state variation and have failed to explore 
 
 5. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, FULL REPORT 45 (2012), available at http://www. 
statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-
Full.pdf. Highlighting the challenges faced by public pension plans, the Task Force Chairmen 
Richard Ravitch and Paul Volcker emphasize that “[i]t is human nature to prefer the present to 
the future. Governments display that time preference by promising now and paying later: if they 
can, they will underestimate liabilities, underfund annual costs, and take on substantial 
investment risks to make it look like promises will be kept.” Id. 
 6. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: WHAT NOW? 75 (2012). 
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systematically why certain plans have been so much better than others at 
achieving funding discipline in the face of budgetary pressures and 
competing priorities. The failure to answer this question has necessarily 
limited the range of state and local government policy solutions, most of 
which have thus far focused on temporary cutbacks in benefits or increases in 
employee contributions, rather than on long-term structural reforms.7 
This Article disaggregates the state pension data and harnesses newly 
collected data on the institutional differences at the plan level to 
systematically analyze the factors affecting funding discipline. Part II 
introduces the public plan infrastructure, presents the findings of prior 
scholarship, and identifies the gap in our understanding of how certain 
statutory and constitutional provisions impact long-term funding discipline. 
Part III catalogs previously unexplored institutional differences among 
pension plans and sets forth the testable hypotheses regarding their impact 
on funding discipline. Part IV describes the dataset and the empirical 
methodology. Part V presents the analysis and results. Part VI discusses the 
policy implications that follow from these empirical findings. Finally, Part VII 
concludes. 
II. FUNDING DISCIPLINE 
A. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 
Unlike private sector retirement systems, public pension plans are still 
predominately defined benefit arrangements, whereby workers are promised 
a specified monthly benefit at retirement, often calculated through a formula 
that considers final salary and years of service.8 Most states have multiple 
pension “plans” to cover different segments of government employees. As 
used in this Article, a pension plan refers to a program that offers a set of 
pension benefits to eligible participants.9 Approximately half of the states 
maintain separate statewide plans for teachers, and most states also maintain 
 
 7. See, e.g., Selected Approved Changes to State Public Pensions to Restore or Preserve Plan Sustainability, 
NAT’L ASS’N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS. (2014), http://www.nasra.org/files/Compiled%20Resources/ 
nasrasustainabilitychanges.pdf. 
 8. For example, a worker might be entitled at retirement to 2% of final average salary for 
each year worked. An employee who has worked for 30 years for the particular employer would 
be entitled 60% of her final average salary; an employee whose final average salary was $100 per 
year would be entitled to $60 per year in pension benefits, not counting retiree healthcare 
benefits. 
 9. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 3418 U.S. public pension plans in 
2010, of which 222 were administered at the state (rather than the municipal) level. Membership 
in these 222 state-administered pension plans comprised 89.6% of the total U.S. public pension 
plan membership. Of the 3196 locally administered plans, approximately 2200 covered local 
units in just three states: Pennsylvania (1425 plans), Illinois (457 plans), and Florida (303 plans). 
See ERICA BECKER-MEDINA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS STATE- 
AND LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED PENSIONS SUMMARY REPORT: 2010, at 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/g10-aret-sl.pdf. 
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separate and often relatively more generous plans for judges, legislators, and 
public safety officers.10 
To manage and administer pension plans, states have set up pension 
“systems,” which are generally separate legal entities governed by boards of 
trustees. In a common scenario, one system administers several plans for state 
and local general employees, legislators, and judges, and a separate system 
administers a pension plan for teachers. A state-administered pension system 
may administer plans that cover only employees of the state or it may 
administer plans that cover employees of both state and municipal employers. 
A few state-administered systems—like the Illinois Municipal Retirement 
Fund—administer plans that cover only the employees of participating 
municipal governments.11 To illustrate the possible permutations in the 
organization of state-administered pensions, Appendix A provides an 
overview of the pension systems and plans in Hawaii, Massachusetts, and 
Missouri. 
In stark contrast to the 401(k)-type defined contribution plans that are 
pervasive in the private sector, public sector defined benefit plans allocate the 
management and investment risk to the employers, thus making the 
employers liable for the promised amounts regardless of investment 
performance in any given period. Furthermore, while the federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) imposes funding 
requirements on all defined benefit plans established by private sector 
employers, state and municipal plans are virtually free from any federal 
oversight.12 The state and municipal governments that make the pension 
promises are therefore also in charge of putting aside the money to fund such 
long-term liabilities. Although early public pension plans were operated on a 
pay-as-you-go model, over time states began to link pension contribution 
levels to actuarial calculations—such that the cost of future benefits “earned” 
by an employee in a given year would be covered by employee and employer 
contributions in that same year.13 Returns from the investment of such 
 
 10. JUN PENG, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT 16–17 (2009). 
 11. See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-132 (2005 & Supp. 2014) (describing elective 
participation procedures for “any city, village, or incorporated town that attains a population over 
5000 inhabitants” in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund); About IMRF, ILL. MUNICIPAL 
RETIREMENT FUND, http://www.imrf.org/info/about.htm (noting that, with the exception of the 
City of Chicago and Cook County, the IMRF has provided retirement benefits to the employees 
of local governments and school districts in Illinois since 1941). 
 12. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. 
ERISA establishes mandatory pre-funding requirements for private employer plans and regulates 
the discounting of liabilities. If a plan is not fully funded, for example, the employer’s annual 
contribution must include the amount necessary to amortize over seven years the difference 
between its liabilities and its assets. Stricter rules apply to severely underfunded plans. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001–1461 (2013). 
 13. See generally Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy B. Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good Governance? 
State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 1317 (2014). For example, “[i]n 2006 . . . the median contribution rate was 8.5% of payroll 
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contributions would also be used to cover benefits.14 Today, a “fully funded” 
plan is a plan that has accumulated sufficient assets to cover all accrued 
benefits.15 
B. VARIATION IN FUNDING DISCIPLINE 
Much of the recent scholarly and policymaker attention has focused on 
calculating the deviation from the fully-funded ideal and on comparing states 
based on the average funding levels of their pension plans.16 The Pew Center 
has reported a trillion-dollar gap between the present value of the promised 
retirement benefits and the available assets.17 In a 2012 report, the Pew 
Center also observed that 16 states lacked funding for more than a third of 
their pension liabilities, while 34 states had pension liabilities that were less 
than 80% funded.18 Meanwhile, some finance scholars have challenged the 
methods used by plans in their liability calculations and have argued that the 
real funding gap has been closer to $3 trillion, or more than $20,000 per U.S. 
household.19 
 
for state and local government employers and 5% for employees [in] plans in which employees 
[were] also covered by Social Security;” for plans in which the employees were not covered by 
Social Security, the rates were 11.5% of payroll for employers and 8% for employees. Jonathan 
Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 840 (2009) (citing 
BARBARA D. BOVBJERG, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
PENSION PLANS: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNDED STATUS (2008), available at http://www. 
gao.gov/new.items/d08983t.pdf). 
 14. See generally Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN STATES 
GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATE IN FISCAL CRISIS 
67–71 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel Jr., eds., 2012). 
 15. See, e.g., MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that “[a] plan is fully funded when its 
assets equal its liabilities”). 
 16. See, e.g., JAGADEESH GOKHALE, CATO INST., FUNDING STATUS, ASSET MANAGEMENT, AND A 
LOOK AHEAD: STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS (2012), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/Gokhale-WP-State-and-Local-Pension-Plans.pdf; PEW CTR. ON THE 
STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE (2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/ 
legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/PewPensionsUpdatepdf.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 3; Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Policy Options for State Pension Systems and 
Their Impact on Plan Liabilities, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 173 (2011); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua 
Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211 (2011). See 
generally MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 1.  
 17. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 16, at 1. 
 18. Id. at 5. 
 19. Rauh, supra note 1, at 32. Economists such as Brown, Wilcox, and Rauh have posited in 
a series of influential articles that pension plans are understating the amounts of unfunded 
liabilities by using a discount rate that reflects expected returns on assets instead of the riskiness 
of the liabilities. See Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discounting State and Local Pension 
Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 538, 538 (2009). The authors point out that linking the discount 
rate to the expected return allows pension plan sponsors, against all findings of conventional 
finance theory, to reduce their liabilities by investing in riskier securities because a higher 
discount rate will result in a smaller present value of liabilities. See id.; see also MUNNELL ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 4 (noting that using a discount rate of 5% instead of 8% increased the aggregate 
liability from $3.8 trillion to $5.5 trillion); Andrew G. Biggs, Understanding the True Cost of State 
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Although the generosity of public sector pension benefits and the 
investment losses suffered in the last recession have been widely blamed for 
the funding gaps,20 experts have identified the lack of funding discipline—
defined here as the failure by public employers to make consistent payments 
of the so-called “annual required contribution”—as a very serious, non-market 
related cause of pension underfunding for some plans.21 The GASB defines 
the “annual required contribution” (“ARC”) as the annual contribution that 
a public employer must pay into its pension fund to cover the cost of benefits 
accrued in that year and to pay off any accrued unfunded liabilities in no more 
than 30 years.22 Even though making the full ARC payments is considered 
essential for the responsible management of long-term liabilities,23 public 
employers have exhibited tremendous variation in funding discipline, with 
some states and localities consistently making the full ARC payments but 
others habitually skipping or underpaying their ARCs.24 In 2010, fewer than 
 
and Local Pensions, 63 ST. TAX NOTES 565, 565–66 (2012). In 2012 the GASB adopted new 
standards that, for purposes of disclosure only, impose certain restrictions on the use of the 
expected rate of return as the discount rate. See infra Part VI.A. 
 20. See, e.g., Josh Barro, Dodging the Pension Disaster, 7 NAT’L AFF. 3, 4–5 (2011) (finding that 
one “fundamental problem” with the pension plans offered by state and local governments all 
across America is that “in many cases, the benefits are excessively costly, insofar as they are more 
generous than is necessary to attract qualified talent to government work”); Biggs, supra note 19, 
at 565 (stating that funding shortfalls were caused by “market declines, funding holidays, and 
benefit increases passed during the prosperous days of the late 1990s”). 
 21. See, e.g., STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 37. 
 22. See GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF GASB 
STATEMENTS 25, 26, AND 27 ON PENSION REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE BY STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PLANS AND EMPLOYERS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 13–15 (1997), available at 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=1176163117979&ac
ceptedDisclaimer=true. 
 23. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 16, at 6 (“Keeping up with the annual 
required contribution is perhaps the most effective way that states can responsibly manage their 
long-term liabilities for public sector retirement benefits.”). The Pew Center’s “research shows 
that states that consistently make their full payments have better-funded retirement systems and 
smaller gaps.” Id.; see also FITCH RATINGS, ENHANCING THE ANALYSIS OF U.S. STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PENSION OBLIGATIONS 3 (2011), available at http://www.ncpers.org/Files/2011_ 
enhancing_the_analysis_of_state_local_government_pension_obligations.pdf (“The systems that 
pose the greatest risks are those with significant unfunded liabilities for which the government’s 
annual payments have been significantly less than an actuarially determined ARC over multiple 
years.”); JUN PENG & ILANA BOIVIE, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., LESSONS FROM WELL-FUNDED PUBLIC 
PENSIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF SIX PLANS THAT WEATHERED THE FINANCIAL STORM 6 (2011), available 
at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/humanresources/benefits/lessons-pensions.pdf (“The 
most fundamental principle in ensuring a plan achieves a 100% funding ratio is ensuring that 
the plan sponsors pay the entire amount of the annual required contribution (ARC) each year, 
because anything short of a full ARC payment will have a negative impact on the plan’s funding 
ratio in the long run.”). 
 24. The variation can be seen across plans of varying benefits levels, such that the lack of 
funding discipline is not a problem only for relatively more generous plans. See generally 
MUNNELL, supra note 6. 
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65% of state-administered plans25 received the full ARC contribution.26 
Between 2001 and 2010, for example, the California Public Employees 
Retirement plan received 100% of the ARC, while the California State 
Teachers Retirement plan received on average only 76%. The Illinois State 
Teachers and the Illinois State Employees plans received on average only 71% 
of the ARC, while the Illinois Municipal Retirement plan received 99%.27 
The measure of funding discipline through the use of the ARC 
benchmark reflects the unique regulatory environment for public pension 
plans, in which GASB standards have had a profound impact on funding 
policies. Since public plans are not covered by ERISA and not subject to 
federal oversight, the only source of standardization has come from the GASB. 
Although GASB standards are not federal law and GASB has no enforcement 
authority, its reporting standards are generally recognized by state and local 
governments as authoritative, and compliance with such standards has come 
to be expected for participation in the market for municipal debt. 
In particular, under GASB standards in effect through 2014,28 each plan 
has had to disclose each year its ARC for that year and for the six prior years, 
as well as the actual contributions received from employers or the state. 
Although called the annual “required” contribution, because GASB has no 
enforcement authority over state or municipal governments, the ARC has 
referred only to the contribution amount that would satisfy GASB’s 
parameters for actuarially sound funding.29 Nevertheless, the percentage of 
the ARC actually contributed has been an important benchmark of funding 
discipline across public pension plans.30 
 
 25. As used throughout this Article, “state-administered” plans include plans created by 
state statute that pool together, at least for administrative and investment purposes, employees of 
participating municipalities or other local entities, even if the pension system that administers 
such plans is legally separate and fiscally independent from the state. 
 26. Calculated by author using data on 110 plans. For additional background on the structure 
of retirement plans and systems, and on the data collection techniques, see infra Part IV. 
 27. Calculated by author using data from the Boston College Center for Retirement 
Research. For additional background on the data collection techniques, see infra Part IV. 
 28. In 2012, GASB adopted a series of changes, including the elimination of the ARC 
disclosure requirement. For a discussion of such changes, see infra Part VI. 
 29. In particular, any unfunded actuarial accrued liability must be funded over a period not 
to exceed 30 years (40 years prior to 2006). Additional parameters for the ARC calculation are 
set forth in GASB STATEMENT NO. 25. GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FINANCIAL REPORTING 
FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
17 (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage? 
cid=1176160029908&acceptedDisclaimer=true. 
 30. The ARC measure is informative but imperfect. It is not completely standardized and 
may reflect the variation in certain actuarial assumptions and methodologies heretofore 
permitted by the GASB. For example, particularly rosy assumptions about expected rates of 
return, dim projections about salary growth, and a rolling 30-year amortization period are all 
means to decrease the amount of the “required contribution.” Certain tactics recently employed 
by a handful of states—such as permitting an employer to borrow from the plan to make the 
required contribution—also cloud the meaning of the ARC measure. See Danny Hakim, To Pay 
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Chart 1 illustrates the mean percentage of ARC contributed to 110 state-
administered public pension plans between 2001 and 2010.31 Charts 2, 3, and 
4 show the distribution of funding discipline across these plans in 2001, 2005, 
and 2010. 
 
Chart 1. Mean Percentage of ARC Contributed 2001-2010 
 
 
Chart 2. Distribution of ARC Contributions in 2001 
 
 
New York Pension Fund, Cities Borrow from It First, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/02/28/nyregion/to-pay-new-york-pension-fund-cities-borrow-from-it-
first.html. 
 31. For a discussion of the data collection techniques, see Part IV. 
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Chart 3. Distribution of ARC Contributions in 2005 
 
Chart 4. Distribution of ARC Contributions in 2010 
 
 
These charts reveal that although a sizable portion of the plans receive 
contributions that meet or exceed the GASB’s ARC standards, many do not 
receive anything close to 100% of the recommended amounts, with some 
receiving no employer contributions in certain years. The variance is greater 
in 2010 than in 2005 or 2001, and in the years following the 2008 economic 
downturn, fewer plans met the GASB benchmarks. 
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C. PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP 
Scholarship on public pension plans has been growing rapidly. 
Economists have challenged pension accounting conventions and have 
identified significant differences in funding patterns across states and plans,32 
while legal scholars have focused on the legal limits of pension reform.33 Both 
disciplines have examined the impact of board composition on a variety of 
outcomes, and especially on investment performance.34 But the impact of 
legal institutions on plan-funding discipline has received much less attention. 
Indeed, the scholarship on funding discipline has been called “embryonic,”35 
and comprehensive studies of public-plan governance provisions in the 
funding context are “lacking.”36 
What do we know so far about plan funding? Prior empirical scholarship 
has identified persistent differences in the “funding practices” or funding 
“habits” among pension plans.37 Economists have found that patterns of full 
funding or underfunding tend to persist from year to year.38 They have also 
 
 32. See supra notes 16 & 19 (describing examples of recent scholarship). 
 33. For analysis of the legal limitations to pension reform, see generally Daniel J. Kaspar, 
Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving Toward a More Transparent Accounting of State Public Employee 
Pension Plans, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 129 (2011); Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: 
The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617 (2010); Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The 
“California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029 (2012); Paul M. 
Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 263 (2011); Debra Brubaker Burns, Note, Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay: States, Their 
Public-Pension Bills, and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 253 (2011); Whitney Cloud, 
Comment, State Pension Deficits, the Recession, and a Modern View of the Contracts Clause, 120 YALE 
L.J. 2199 (2011); Stuart Buck, Legal Obstacles to State Pension Reform (Ass’n for Educ. Fin. & Policy, 
Working Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917563. 
 34. See, e.g., Olivia S. Mitchell & Ping-Lung Hsin, Public Pension Governance and Performance, 
in THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 92 
(Salvador Valedés-Prieto ed., 1997); David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund 
Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
187 (2005); John R. Nofsinger, Why Targeted Investing Does Not Make Sense!, 27 FIN. MGMT. 87 
(1998); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); Sylvester J. Schieber, Political Economy of Public Sector Retirement Plans, 
10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 269 (2011); Michael Useem & Olivia S. Mitchell, Holders of the Purse 
Strings: Governance and Performance of Public Retirement Systems, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 489 (2000). 
 35. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 75. 
 36. Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 13, at 4. 
 37. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, Pension Funding in the Public Sector, 76 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 278, 288 (1994) (finding “wide variations in funding practices” and noting that “pension 
funding ‘habits’ do seem to persist in the public sector”); see also Tim V. Eaton & John R. 
Nofsinger, The Eﬀect of Financial Constraints and Political Pressure on the Management of Public Pension 
Plans, 23 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 161, 186–87 (2004) (finding evidence of persistent funding 
behaviors); Tongxuan (Stella) Yang & Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Governance, Funding, and 
Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal 16 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2005-2, 
2005), available at http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/WP2005-2.pdf (finding 
that “funding patterns are positively correlated over time, confirming the behavioral persistence 
hypothesis”). 
 38. See Mitchell & Smith, supra note 37, at 282–84. 
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shown that fiscal stress—as measured by the unemployment rate, for 
example—has been associated with certain plan sponsors (i.e., the public 
employers that set up the pension plan) trying to reduce contributions to 
their pension plans,39 sometimes indirectly through the manipulation of 
actuarial assumptions.40 
But what are the causal mechanisms through which funding “habits” are 
formed? A survey of the existing literature suggests that control over funding 
decisions may be one important factor. Policymakers have observed that states 
vary greatly in the way they organize the funding of their pension plans: some 
plans have a guaranteed draw on state funds for actuarially determined 
annual contributions, while others receive only the statutorily set contribution 
amounts, which may not be updated by the state legislatures for years at a 
time.41 More generally, laws in some states are “fundamentally at odds”42 with 
the financial requirements of funding pension obligations insofar as they 
impose constraints on employer contributions that prevent employers from 
making the full ARC. At least one empirical study so far has shown that 
“[p]lans with statutory contribution limits are likely to [receive] a smaller 
percentage of their ARC[s].”43 
On the other hand, “strong legislation” that takes pension contributions 
out of the annual political budget appropriation process—for example, by 
giving the state comptroller the authority to deduct missed payments from 
 
 39. Id. at 288 (finding that fiscal pressure, as measured by unemployment in a given state, 
“appears to cause some public employers to reduce their annual contributions below required 
levels” (emphasis added)). Stoycheva finds that in some periods between 2000 and 2009, “fiscal 
stress influenced pension funding through direct reductions in the contributions to the pension 
plans versus indirect reductions through manipulation of the discount rate.” Rayna. L Stoycheva, 
Sustainable Governance and Management of Defined Benefit Plans in the Public Sector: Lessons 
from the Turbulent Decade of 2000–2009, at 89 (Aug. 11, 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia 
State University), available at http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043& 
context=pmap_diss; see also Barbara A. Chaney et al., The Eﬀect of Fiscal Stress and Balanced Budget 
Requirements on the Funding and Measurement of State Pension Obligations, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 
287, 296 (2002). But see Yang & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 17 (finding “no evidence . . . that fiscal 
distress due to unusually high unemployment rates prompts public employers to underfund their 
pension promises”). 
 40. See Chaney et al., supra note 39, at 289–306 (finding that fiscally stressed states select 
discount rate assumptions that reduce funding requirements); see also Eaton & Nofsinger, supra 
note 37, at 163 (showing that “governments” facing tight financial constraints are more likely to 
reduce pension contributions through the manipulation of actuarial assumptions in a way that 
reduces required contributions); J. Fred Giertz & Leslie E. Papke, Public Pension Plans: Myths and 
Realities for State Budgets, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 2, 318–21 (2007) (discussing actuarial assumptions in 
public plans). 
 41. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 42. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., WHY DON’T SOME 
STATES AND LOCALITIES PAY THEIR REQUIRED PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS? 2 (2008), available at 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/slp_7-508.pdf. 
 43. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., LOCALLY-
ADMINISTERED PENSION PLANS: 2007–2011, at 1, 4 (2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/slp_29.pdf. 
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state funds due to the delinquent employer—has been associated in case 
studies with better funding discipline and may explain the striking variation 
in funding discipline even among plans within the same state.44 Such 
anecdotal observations are consistent with the scholarly observation that the 
decision to fund a state pension plan is subject to the legislative budgeting 
process in which legislators may decide—often in a bipartisan fashion45—to 
deprioritize funding pension plans that are not facing immediate liquidity 
constraints. Commitment devices that remove pension funding from the 
political process and provide an “automatic” draw on state and local resources 
may also be particularly important in the absence of effective monitoring by 
relevant stakeholders. Recent scholarship has highlighted the diffuse nature 
of the harm that results when the costs of pension benefits accrued by current 
workers are not covered by current workers or taxpayers. Of the constituents 
primarily affected by underfunding—the participants and the taxpayers—
neither group has the incentives to monitor plan funding.46 
In sum, existing scholarship on pension funding discipline has identified 
certain funding patterns and has increasingly pointed to the importance of 
constraints on the short-term preferences of political actors in the 
 
 44. PENG & BOIVIE, supra note 23, at 7. Peng and Boivie highlight the success of the Illinois 
Municipal Retirement Fund (“Illinois MRF”), which, unlike the chronically underfunded Illinois 
pension plans for state employees and teachers, is well funded as a result of consistent payments 
of the full ARC amount. According to Peng and Boivie, an “important factor that contributes to 
Illinois MRF’s strong contribution management is that the state statute governing employer 
contributions gives the board of trustees broad authority . . . to sue in civil courts to collect 
delinquent payments from local employers” and also allows the comptroller to “deduct the 
[delinquent] amounts . . . from any grants of state funds to the municipality.” Id. at 21. 
 45. A recent working paper by political scientists highlights the bipartisan nature of pension 
politics in “normal” times and shows that from 1999 to 2008, Democrats and Republicans voted 
together on pension-related bills. Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Pensions 11–12 
(Inst. for Research on Labor & Emp’t, Univ. of Cal. at Berkley, Working Paper No. 108-14, 2013), 
available at http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/108-14.pdf. 
 46. The former group lacks the incentive to monitor because its benefits are fixed; that is, 
participants do not share directly in the upside of high investment returns or consistent funding, 
and the most empowered participants are also unlikely to feel the downside of poor funding. 
Collective bargaining rights have thus not been found to be a significant predictor of funding 
discipline. See MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 8. Taxpayers, on the other hand, are ultimately affected 
by plan funding and performance, but face information and collective action challenges that 
prevent effective monitoring. The impact of “funding and investment decisions may not be felt 
until some point far in the future,” monitoring the board may be costly, and the benefits to any 
individual taxpayer from this effort are marginal. Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 13, at 1330. 
A third group of constituents—the buyers of municipal debt—has begun, in the wake of 
municipal bankruptcies, to monitor pension underfunding, but the full scope and impact of its 
involvement remains to be seen. There is some indication, however, that state credit ratings have 
motivated pension funding. See, e.g., Michael B. Marois, Alaska Taps Rainy-Day Cash for Pension 
Gap: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
07-09/alaska-taps-rainy-day-cash-for-pension-gap-muni-credit.html (noting that rating agencies 
identified Alaska’s pension liabilities as the biggest risk to the state’s credit rating and detailing 
the state’s subsequent plan to tap its budget-reserve account to pay unfunded pension liabilities). 
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management of long-term government obligations. The scope and 
effectiveness of such constraints, however, is not yet well understood. 
III. INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION 
Building on the anecdotal evidence and prior studies discussed above, 
this Part identifies and categorizes previously unexplored institutional 
differences among pension plans and sets forth the testable hypotheses 
regarding the impact of the variation on funding discipline. The focus of the 
categorization is on the variation in control over funding decisions and on the 
transparency with respect to funding liabilities. Variation in control over 
funding decisions is present at various points during the funding process and 
can be thought of as a series of contests for control between the following sets 
of parties: (1) local vs. state employers, (2) pension system trustees vs. 
legislatures, (3) delinquent employers vs. pension system trustees, and 
(4) legislatures and pension system trustees vs. state constitutions. The degree 
of transparency is a direct function of the liability-sharing terms of the plan, 
which take one of the three forms described in detail in Part III.B. 
A. VARIATION IN THE ALLOCATION OF CONTROL OVER FUNDING DECISIONS 
1. Local Employers vs. State Employers 
Public pension plans vary greatly in the composition of public employers 
that control and contribute to such plans. Among state-administered plans, 
some are funded only by municipal and local employers, while others are 
funded either entirely or at least in part by state-level employers.47 This Article 
asks whether separating control over plan administration and plan funding at 
two different levels of government is associated with improved funding 
discipline. 
The question is motivated in part by prior observations that some public 
pension plans are like “cookie jar[s] in the household[s] of the state[s].”48 
Anecdotally, there are instances of states withholding contributions from 
plans funded solely by the state. For example, New Jersey and Connecticut 
have effectively skipped or made less-than-the-recommended contributions to 
 
 47. See, e.g., CONN. MUN. EMPS. RET. SYS., SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.osc.ct.gov/rbsd/cmers/plandoc/MERFSPD7107.pdf (explaining that municipalities 
make contributions at rates set by the State Retirement Commission and also contribute toward the 
administrative costs of the plan); STATE OF CONN., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 73–74 (2011), available at http://www.osc.ct.gov/ 
2010cafr/CAFR10.pdf (noting that the state makes the contributions for the state employees plan, 
as well as the teachers plan, while it does not make any contributions to the municipal employees 
plan). 
 48. Chaney et al., supra note 39, at 290 (quoting Richard M. Ennis, Is a Statewide Pension 
Fund a Person or a Cookie Jar? The Answer Has Implications for Investment Policy, 44 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 
21, 23 (1988)). 
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their teachers’ plans, both of which were funded by the states.49 In contrast, 
the Connecticut Municipal Pension Plan, a state-administered plan funded by 
participating municipal employers, has received all recommended 
contributions in full over the 2001–2010 decade.50 
The terms affecting system administration and plan funding are typically 
set in state statutes. Therefore, in plans comprised of only municipal-level 
employers, no single municipal employer on its own controls or can change 
the funding requirements. In such plans, plan funding and plan 
administration are separated at different “levels” of government: the funding 
comes from municipal-level employers while the administration and oversight 
generally take place at the state level (albeit with input from local employers 
and employees).51 By comparison, where the state is the sole employer in a 
state-administered plan, a state legislature faced with large pension 
contributions can decide to change the funding statutes. The testable 
hypothesis is that state-administered plans funded solely by local employers 
are expected to have relatively better funding discipline than plans in which 
the state functions in both an administrative and an employer (funding) 
capacity. 
2. Pension System Trustees vs. State Legislatures 
Regardless of the employer composition, pension plans are administered 
by pension “systems.” Pension systems are generally legally separate 
organizations with boards of trustees who are charged, as fiduciaries, with the 
administration of the pension plans.52 Yet even as legally separate entities, 
 
 49. JAMES CLEMENTE, N.J. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DIV. OF PENSIONS & BENEFITS, TEACHERS’ 
PENSION AND ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 39 (n.d.), available at http://www. 
state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/annrpt2010/tpaf10.pdf (showing state contributions to the New 
Jersey Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund for the 2005–2010 period); JAMES CLEMENTE, N.J. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DIV. OF PENSIONS & BENEFITS, TEACHERS’ PENSION AND ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 37 (n.d.), available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/ann 
reports_2005/tpaf.pdf (showing state contributions to the New Jersey Teachers’ Pension and 
Annuity Fund for the 2001–2005 period); GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., CONNECTICUT STATE 
TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM REPORT ON THE ACTUARIAL VALUATION AS OF JUNE 30, 2006, at E-
3, available at http://www.ct.gov/trb/lib/trb/formsandpubs/actuarial_valuation_rep_2006.pdf 
(showing state contributions to the Connecticut State Teachers’ plan fell below the ARC during 
the 2001–2006 period). 
 50. Based on data assembled by the author. See infra Part IV.A; see also STATE OF CONN., supra 
note 47, at 74–75 (noting that “[t]he State acts solely as the administrator and the custodian of 
the assets of the Connecticut Municipal Employees’ Retirement System” and describing the 
contributions from employees and participating municipalities). 
 51. See, e.g., CONN. MUN. EMPS. RET. SYS., supra note 47, at 1–3 (noting that “[t]he State 
Retirement Commission is responsible for the administration of the [Connecticut Municipal 
Employees’ Retirement System]” and describing the contributions from the municipalities). 
 52. In most cases, state governments do not administer pension plans themselves, although, 
as this Article shows, they often maintain control over certain funding decisions. A few state pension 
systems are administered by state agencies or departments within state government. In Michigan, 
for example,  
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retirement systems are creatures of state statute, and the governor and 
legislature determine the trustee selection process. The effectiveness of a 
pension system board as a check on the legislature depends not only on the 
scope of powers statutorily delegated to the trustees, but also on the trustee 
selection process and the ultimate composition of the pension system board. 
The empirical question is whether greater trustee independence and 
authority promotes better funding discipline. 
Trustee selection varies widely across plans. Trustees are either elected 
by plan participants, appointed by the governor or the legislature, or are 
holders of public office (such as state treasurer or comptroller) serving ex 
officio (i.e., by virtue of holding the public office position). For some systems, 
statutory provisions allow the governor to appoint all of the trustees. Other 
statutory provisions leave the selection of trustees to the system members. 
Table 1 illustrates the significant differences in trustee composition in a 
sample of systems. In times of displeasure with the retirement system boards, 
governors have on occasion tried to replace elected trustees with appointees, 
as Governor Pete Wilson did in California in the 1990s when he tried to gain 
control of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) 
by proposing to replace the board with political appointees. But such power 
has not gone unchecked. In California, for example, an initiative measure 
subsequently led to a constitutional amendment that sets “the number, terms, 
and method of selection or removal of members of the retirement board,” 














[t]he Office of Retirement Services [(“ORS”)] . . . administers four defined benefit 
pension plans, two defined contribution pension plans, and one defined benefit 
plus a defined contribution plan with combined net assets of nearly $50.54 
billion . . . . ORS is a division of Michigan’s Department of Technology, Management 
and Budget.  
About ORS, MICH. OFF. OF RETIREMENT SERVICES, http://www.michigan.gov/ors/0,4649,7-144-
45490-263981--,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
 53. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(f). 
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Table 1. 2010 Composition of Boards—Examples Selected To Show 
Variation Across Systems 
Plan Composition of Board 
California Public 
Employees 
(13 Board members) 
Six elected members:
 Two members elected by all of the CalPERS members;  one 
elected by all active state members; one elected by and 
from all active school members; one elected by and from 
all active local members; and one elected by and from the 
retired members of CalPERS54 
Three appointed members: 
 An elected official of a local government and an official of 
a life insurer; one public representative appointed jointly 
by the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Committee 
on Rules55 
Four ex officio members: 
 The State Treasurer; the State Controller; the Director of 
the Department of Personnel Administration; and a 
designee of the State Personnel Board56  
Delaware State 
Employees 
(7 Board members) 
Two ex officio members: 
 The Secretary of Finance and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget57 
Five appointed members: 
 Five members appointed by the Governor with the consent 
of a majority of the members elected to the Senate. At least 
two of the appointed members must be affiliated with one 
of the major political parties, and at least two of the 
appointed members must be affiliated with the other major 
political party. Anyone who declines to announce his or 
her political affiliation is not eligible for appointment as a 
member of the Board.58  
Illinois Municipal 
Retirement 
(8 Board members) 
Eight elected members:
 Four trustees must each be a chief executive officer, chief 
finance officer, or other officer, executive or department 
head of a participating municipality or participating 
instrumentality. 
 Three trustees must each be employees of a participating 
municipality or participating instrumentality. 




     54.     CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20090 (West 2003) (in effect in 2010).  
     55.     Id. 
     56.     Id. 
     57.     DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8308(e)(1) (Supp. 2008) (in effect in 2010). 
     58.     Id. § 8309(e)(2)–(4). 
     59.     40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-174 (2008) (in effect in 2010). 
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The hypothesis is that the presence of ex officio members on the board 
is expected to be associated with weaker funding discipline because ex officio 
members necessarily face competing priorities with respect to public funds 
and may try to use whatever discretion is available to them—through the 
board or through the legislature—to divert funds away from pension 
contributions toward other projects and priorities, particularly if such 
priorities result in outcomes that are more immediately visible and favored by 
voters. Thus, when compared to the priorities of a board member who is only 
a public employee or retiree,60 such competing budgetary priorities are likely 
to weigh against fully funding the pension plan. Of course, in cases where 
other institutional features of the plan restrict the authority of the board with 
respect to the funding decisions, board composition may not have a 
significant impact. 
Indeed, despite the delegation of “administration” to the pension system 
boards, legislatures generally reserve to themselves certain controls over the 
pension funding process. The first step in the funding process is the valuation 
of assets and liabilities. Although in theory a technical exercise performed by 
an actuary, in practice either the board or the legislature sets the many critical 
factors—including the discount rate and the amortization period—that 
boards use in the calculation. Once the actuarial valuation of assets and 
liabilities is complete, the employee and employer contributions must be set. 
While the employee contribution rate is almost always fixed in the statute at a 
certain percent of the employee salary, the setting of the employer rate varies 
greatly from plan to plan. Table 2 shows examples of the relevant statutory 
provisions. 
The critical distinction is between plans in which the rate is determined 
by the actuarial valuation and those in which the rate is set in statute by the 
legislature.61 In the former case, the actuarial determinations may still be 
constrained by certain statutory or board-approved parameters and 
 
 60. State government officials are typically themselves members of state pension plans. 
 61. There are also more granular differences within each category, as both the actuarial 
approach and the statutory approach can be made more or less aligned with the GASB 
recommended ARC. For example, in the case of Florida, the statutory contribution rates are 
frequently adjusted by the legislature to preserve the required amortization period; indeed, 
Florida Statute Section 121.71 has been amended nearly each year between 2002 and 2010.  See, 
e.g., 2009 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2009-76; 2008 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2008-139 (West); 2007 Fla. Sess. 
Law Serv. 2007-84 (West); 2006 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2006-35 (West); 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 
2005-93 (West); 2004 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2004-293 (West); 2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2003-206 
(West); 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2002-402 (West). The case of Alaska Teachers Retirement 
System (“TRS”), on the other hand, shows the limitations of the provision for actuarial 
determination. A 2006 audit found that the “TRS board sought to maintain a level, long-term 
contribution rate of 12 percent for participating employers. Such a strategy resulted in the board 
often adopting rates lower than the actuarial calculated rates.” PAT DAVIDSON, DEPARTMENTS OF 
ADMINISTRATION AND REVENUE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM, AND ALASKA STATE PENSION INVESTMENT BOARD 21 (2006) (citations omitted), available at 
http://legaudit.akleg.gov/docs/audits/special/combined/30037rpt-2006.pdf. 
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assumptions, but the contribution rate is nevertheless responsive to 
fluctuations in the value of plan assets and liabilities. In the latter case, the 
actual rate or contribution amount may be set in statute or the statute may 
provide for certain restrictions or caps on employer contributions. Although 
the statutory language may provide that such statutory rates reflect actuarial 
valuations and are intended to amortize unfunded liabilities within a certain 
period, once the statutory rates are set, any changes require legislative action. 
Thus, statutory rates are necessarily stickier than rates determined annually 
or semiannually by actuarial valuation.62 
 
Table 2. Examples of 2010 Statutory Provisions for the Determination of the 
Employer Contribution 




 Section 20814(a) of the California Government Code 
provides that with respect to the state’s contribution “[t]he 
Legislature shall adopt the actuary’s contribution rates and 
authorize the appropriation in the Budget Act.”63  
 Section 20814(b) states that “[t]he employer contribution 
rates for all other public employers under this system shall 
be determined on an annual basis by the actuary and shall 





 Section 22950(a) of the California Education Code 
provides that “[e]mployers shall contribute monthly to the 
system 8 percent of the creditable compensation upon which 
members’ contributions under this part are based.”65  
 Section 22951 requires employers to contribute 0.25 
percent for retirement benefits accrued from unused sick 
leave.66  
 
 62. Administrators of plans with statutorily determined rates often note the need for 
statutory adjustments to maintain actuarially sound plans. For example, employer contribution 
rates for the Montana Public Employers Retirement plan are fixed in statute. The 2010 CAFR for 
Montana PERS, prepared by the board and the actuary, points to the funding challenges of the 
system since the last statutory rate adjustment: 
All systems were actuarially funded within the required 30 years in 2007 and 
2008. . . . Effective July 1, 2009, PERS-DBRP and SRS received the last employer 
contribution increase under the 2007 Legislative Session House Bill 131. Based on 
economic conditions of the past two years and according to the PERB’s June 30, 
2010 actuarial valuations, the unfunded liability in PERS-DBRP, GWPORS and SRS 
will not amortize within 30 years. 
MONT. PUB. EMP. RET. BD., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 30 (n.d.), available at http://mpera.mt.gov/docs/2010CAFR.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
      63.     CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20814(a) (West 2003) (emphasis added) (in effect in 2010). 
      64.     CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20814(b) (West 2003) (emphasis added) (in effect in 2010). 
      65.     CAL. EDU. CODE § 22950(a) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis added) (in effect in 2010). 
      66.     CAL. EDU. CODE § 22951 (West 2002) (in effect 2010). 
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 Section 22954 directs appropriation of funds for the 
Supplemental Benefit.67  
 Under Section 22955(a) “a continuous appropriation is 
hereby annually made from the General Fund . . . for 
transfer to the Teachers’ Retirement Fund . . . equal to 
2.017 percent of the total of the creditable 
compensation . . . upon which members’ contributions are 
based.”68  
Hawaii ERS (statutory 
determination) 
Section 88-122 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated 
provides that “based on regular interest and such mortality 
and other tables as are adopted by the board of trustees, the 
actuary engaged by the board, on the basis of successive 
annual actuarial valuations, shall determine the employer's 
normal cost and accrued liability contributions for each fiscal 
year . . . . Commencing with fiscal year 2008–2009 and each 
subsequent fiscal year until fiscal year 2011–2012, the 
employer contributions for normal cost and accrued 
liability . . . shall be based on nineteen and seven-tenths per cent of 
the member’s compensation for police officers, firefighters, 
and corrections officers and fifteen per cent of the member’s 




Section 61.565(5)(a) of the Kentucky Revised Statute provides 
that “[i]t is the intent of the General Assembly to begin 
phasing into the full actuarially required contribution rates.” 
Sections (5)(b) and (c) delineate annual percentage of the 
ARC targets for future years requiring, for example, forty-four 
percent (44%) of the actuarially required contribution for the 
fiscal year beginning July 1, 2010.70  
New York State and 
Local ERS (actuarial 
determination) 
Section 17(a) of the New York Retirement and Social Security 
Law provides that each year “the comptroller shall determine 
the amount which each participating employer is required to 
pay to the retirement system to discharge its obligations 
thereto . . . . This amount shall consist of the amount deemed 
necessary to provide for payment in full of (i) all estimated 
obligations of each participating employer for the current 
fiscal year of the retirement systems and (ii) any additional 
obligation, plus interest on such amount, for fiscal years 
preceding the current fiscal year.”71  
 
 
      67.     CAL. EDU. CODE § 22954 (Supp. 2010). 
      68.    CAL. EDU. CODE § 22955(a) (Supp. 2014) (in effect in 2010). In 2014, after 
“[d]ecade[s]-long efforts” to address the $73.7 billion funding gap, the California legislature 
approved rate increases for member, employer, and state contributions. CalSTRS 2014 Funding 
Plan, CALSTRS, http://www.calstrs.com/calstrs-2014-funding-plan (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
      69.    HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88-122(a), (e) (2012) (emphasis added) (in effect in 2010). 
      70.    KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.565(5), (6) (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added) (in effect in 
2010). 
      71.     N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 17(a) (McKinney Supp. 2004). Article VIII, section 5(D) 
of the New York State Constitution also provides that “[e]ach such pension or retirement system 
or fund thereafter shall be maintained on an actuarial reserve basis with current payments to the 
reserve adequate to provide for all current accruing liabilities.” N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(D). 
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Different plans within the same state—and even plans administered by 
the same system—may have different provisions for setting employer 
contribution rates. For example, in Kentucky, three state-administered plans 
have different provisions regarding employer contributions. The employer 
rates for the Kentucky Teachers Plan are, and have been historically set by 
statute.72 Between 2001 and 2010, 90% of ARC was actually contributed. In 
contrast, the statutory provisions for the County Employees Plan and the 
general Employees Retirement System plan, both of which are administered 
by the same system and the same board, have historically provided for 
actuarially determined employer contribution rates.73 However, while the 
ARC rates for county employers were adopted and fully paid by county 
employers in all but one year between 2001 and 2010, the state has effectively 
ignored the contribution rates for state employers. In each of the years 
between 2001 and 2009, the legislature enacted legislation that 
“notwithstanding” the statutory provision that requires the state as an 
employer to pay an actuarially determined rate, the state would appropriate a 
smaller amount to the pension plan.74 In the 2010 Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report (“CAFR”), the director of the Kentucky Retirement System 
(“KRS”) reported as follows: 
KRS has continued an ongoing effort to raise awareness of the 
impact of reductions to the employer contribution rates. . . . For 12 
out of the last 17 years, the State has appropriated less money than 
requested by the Board of Trustees to adequately fund the annual 
required contribution (ARC). This underfunding, coupled with 
increased beneﬁts, unfunded annual cost of living allowances and 
two major economic recessions in the last decade, has resulted in 
funding ratios . . . that are dropping to alarmingly low levels.75 
The Kentucky example shows the extent of plan-by-plan variation and the 
risks associated with legislative determination of pension contributions. In 
 
 72. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.550 (Supp. 2006) (in effect in 2010). 
 73. Starting in 2010, however, employer contribution rates for the employee retirement 
system (but not the County Employees Plan) are set in statute. See id. § 161.550(6). 
 74. For example, a legislative research commission note from October 19, 2004, explains 
that: 
2004 (1st Extra Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1, sec. 9, provides, ‘Notwithstanding KRS 61.565 
[the statutory provision for actuarially determined rates], the employer contribution 
rate for an entity participating in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System or 
State Police Retirement System shall be as follows: (1) From July 1, 2004, through 
June 30, 2005, the contribution rates shall be no more than 5.89 percent for 
nonhazardous duty employees, 18.84 percent for hazardous duty employees . . . .’ 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.565.  
 75. KY. RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 
JUNE 30, 2010, at 2 (2010), available at https://kyret.ky.gov/Investments%20Annual%20 
Reports/2010-cafr.pdf. 
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contrast, actuarial determination is expected to have a positive effect on 
funding discipline because calculating employer contributions based on 
actuarial results is inherently more responsive to the financial status of the 
plan and thus more aligned with the GASB’s ARC benchmark. Actuarial 
determination is also associated with greater pension board control, which 
shields plan contributions from political tampering by legislatures, and in 
particular, from decreases in—or failures to adequately increase—
contribution rates in times of fiscal stress. Although statutorily set 
contribution rates may be adequate when first set, the legislative consensus 
and coordination needed to make subsequent changes is likely to hinder all 
rate adjustments, and especially those that increase required contributions. 
3. Delinquent Employers vs. Pension System Trustees 
Once the employer contribution rate is established—whether by statute 
or by an actuarial valuation—how does the pension system board ensure the 
contributions are made? Does the availability of certain enforcement 
mechanisms promote funding discipline? 
A public pension board typically cannot force employers to make 
payments, but as Table 3 shows, statutory provisions for some plans explicitly 
require participating employers to make the actuarially required 
contributions. Other state statutes give the pension board or state treasurer 
the right to impose penalties on delinquent contributions or to withhold such 
contributions from funds otherwise due to the delinquent contributors, a 
provision that would appear to be particularly potent with respect to 
municipalities that receive funds from the state. 
The presence of an enforcement mechanism against delinquent 
contributors is expected to be associated with better funding discipline, as 
both the mere threat of withholding and actual withholding of funds are likely 
to promote better funding discipline.76 However, the impact of this statutory 
enforcement mechanism is likely to matter only if an individual employer 
believes that it would actually be used. Furthermore, in certain plans, the 
actual contribution of funds to the plan may be a formality. For example, for 
some state agencies, once funds have been allocated by the state for that 
agency’s pension contribution, the agency is very unlikely to not make the 
actual transfer of the funds. 
  
 
 76. See infra Table 4. 
A6_SHNITSER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2014  10:10 AM 
686 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:663 
Table 3. Examples of 2010 Statutory Enforcement Provisions 




“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the state, any 
school employer, nor any contracting agency shall fail or refuse to pay 
the employers’ contribution required by this chapter or to pay the 
employers’ contributions required by this chapter within the 
applicable time limitations.”77  
California 
Teachers 
“[Should any county superintendent fail] to make payment of any 
assessment by the board, the Controller shall, upon order of the 
board, withhold subsequent payments from the State School Fund to 
the county for deposit in the county school service fund or, upon the 
request of a county superintendent of schools to the county auditor, 
he or she shall withhold payments to a school district for deposit in 
the district general fund until the contributions and report are 
received in acceptable form in the office of the system and the board 
directs the Controller to make those payments less the amount of the 
assessments to the county that would have been paid had no payments 
been withheld. The Controller shall thereupon pay to the system the 
amount of the assessments withheld for deposit in the State Treasury 
to the Teachers’ Retirement Fund.”78  
Hawaii ERS With respect to contributions from counties: “[i]f the amount or any 
portion of the amounts owed is not paid by the county before the 
dates specified . . . the director of finance shall retain out of the 
transient accommodations tax money collected a sum equal to the 
amount or portion thereof not so paid. All the moneys retained and 
collected by the director of finance shall be deposited in the 
appropriate fund or funds of the system. The amount of any 
deficiency in meeting the obligations shall be added to the amount 
due from the county for the succeeding quarter.”79  
Kentucky 
ERS 
“[If a]ny agency participating in the Kentucky Employees Retirement 
System which is not an integral part of the executive branch of state 
government . . . fails to file all contributions and reports on or before 
the tenth day of the month following the period being reported, 
interest on the delinquent contributions at the actuarial rate adopted 
by the board compounded annually, but not less than one thousand 




“If payment of the full amount . . . is not made by the date 
required . . . interest . . . shall commence to run against the unpaid 
balance . . . . The comptroller shall have full power and authority to 
bring suit in the supreme court against any participating employer to 
recover any sum, payment of which is not made as herein required. 
While any such sum shall remain due and unpaid he may refuse to 
audit any claim for funds due to such employer from the state.”81  
 
 
     77.    CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20831 (West 2003) (in effect in 2010). 
     78.     CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23007 (Supp. 2014) (in effect in 2010). 
     79.     HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88-126(c) (2012) (in effect in 2010). 
     80.     KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.675(3)(a), (b) (Supp. 2013) (in effect in 2010). 
     81.     N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 17(d), (e) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (in effect in 2010). 
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4. State Legislatures and Pension System Trustees vs. Constitutional 
Amendments 
A pension system is relatively powerless if the legislature simply refuses to 
appropriate funds to the pension plan in a given year or, as in the case of the 
Kentucky general employees plan discussed above, simply passes legislation to 
reduce the contributions in a particular year.82 Although pension system 
boards and beneficiaries have challenged certain legislative actions, they have 
had, on the whole, very limited support from state courts. Even in the states 
that have explicit constitutional provisions providing for the non-impairment 
of pension benefits,83 courts have rarely read such benefit protections to 
require the protection of plan funding.84 
But what about specific constitutional protections for pension funding? 
Thirteen state constitutions directly address plan funding and require, for 
example, that the plans be funded according to “generally accepted actuarial 
standards” or on an “actuarially sound basis.”85 Some states like Louisiana 
provide extremely detailed funding requirements, including amortization 
periods, in the state constitution.86 A legislature that fails to fund the 
retirement system according to the standard may violate the constitutional 
requirement. The empirical question is whether the presence of such 
constitutional requirements has been associated with better funding 
discipline for the affected plans.87 
 
 82. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 83. See ALASKA CONST. art. 12, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. 29 § 1; HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; ILL. 
CONST. art. XIII, § 5; LA. CONST. art. X, § 29; MICH. CONST. art. IX § 24; N.Y. CONST. art. 5 § 7. 
 84. For example, in People ex rel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg, the court held that 
the constitutional provision protecting against the impairment of pension benefits did not create 
a contractual right to enforce a specific level of pension funding and therefore did not preclude 
the governor from decreasing appropriations to the pension funds. People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of 
Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. 1975). See generally Darryl B. Simko, Of Public 
Pensions, State Constitutional Contract Protection, and Fiscal Constraint, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1059 (1996). 
 85. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXIX, § 1 (“Public retirement systems shall be funded with 
contributions and investment earnings using actuarial methods and assumptions that are 
consistent with generally accepted actuarial standards.”); MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 15 (“Public 
retirement systems shall be funded on an actuarially sound basis.”). 
 86. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29 (“For public retirement systems whose benefits are guaranteed 
by this constitution. . . . The legislature shall, in each fiscal year, by law, provide an amount 
necessary to fund the employer portion of the normal cost . . . [and] provide for the amortization 
of the unfunded accrued liability existing as of June 30, 1988, which shall be determined in 
accordance with the method of valuation selected in [article X, section 29(E)(1)] above, by the 
year 2029, commencing with Fiscal Year 1989–1990. . . . [Such] amounts are . . . hereby 
guaranteed payable, each fiscal year, to each retirement system covered herein. If, for any fiscal 
year, the legislature fails to provide these guaranteed payments, upon warrant of the governing 
authority of the retirement system, following the close of said fiscal year, the state treasurer shall 
pay the amount guaranteed directly from the state general fund.”). 
 87. In a 2014 study, Amy Monahan presents a qualitative examination of states with 
constitutional funding requirements and finds that “having a constitutional funding requirement 
in place does not guarantee sound funding methodology or funding discipline.” See Amy B. 
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Since state constitutions are relatively difficult to change and since 
specific constitutional funding provisions are likely to be enforced by the 
courts in cases of breach, the existence of such provisions is expected to be 
associated with better funding discipline. Although the required level of 
funding “soundness” may vary, such constitutional provisions should serve as 
pre-commitment mechanisms that limit the control of plan sponsors over 
funding decisions. 
B. TRANSPARENCY REGARDING UNFUNDED LIABILITIES 
1. Liability Sharing Arrangements 
In addition to the differences described in Part III.A, public pension 
plans also vary in the allocation of liabilities among the participating public 
employers. Although prior analyses have tended to treat all plans as identical 
in this regard, it is important to examine whether the variation in the liability 
structures described below is associated with different funding patterns. 
Under GASB rules, a pension plan that provides pensions to the 
employees of only one employer is classified for financial reporting purposes 
as a “single-employer” plan (a primary government and its component units 
are considered to be one employer). A pension plan that provides pensions 
to the employees of more than one employer is classified as a “multiple-
employer” plan. If the assets of a multiple-employer plan are pooled for 
investment purposes but separate accounts are maintained for each individual 
employer such that each employer’s share of the pooled assets is legally 
available to pay the pensions of only its employees, the plan is classified as an 
“agent multiple-employer” plan. Employers may also pool both their assets 
and their liabilities in a “cost-sharing multiple-employer” plan. In this 
arrangement, employers share their obligations to provide pensions to their 
employees, and plan assets can be used to pay the pensions of the employees 
of any employer that provides pensions through the plan. While in an agent 
plan, each employer can offer different pension benefits to its employees 
through its own asset and liability accounts, no such separate accounts exist 
in cost-sharing plans, and by joining a cost-sharing plan, an employer loses 
the independence of designing unique benefits. In the public sector, cost-
sharing plans are more common than agent plans, and many state-
administered plans include hundreds of local-level employers in addition to 
the state government employers. 
Chart 5 below summaries the variation in employer liability 





Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436587. 
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2. Disclosure Requirements 
For the 2001–2010 period considered in this Article, one set of 
disclosure obligations applied to employers that participated in single-
employer and agent multiple-employer plans, and a different set of 
obligations applied to employers in cost-sharing multiple-employer plans.88 
For all three types of plans, the plan had to disclose its funding level and the 
ARC for the reporting year and the six prior years. An employer participating 
in a single-employer plan or in an agent multiple-employer plan also had to 
disclose in its own CAFR (separate from the financial report of the plan) the 
funding level for its individual account. By contrast, an employer in a cost-
sharing plan did not have to disclose anything about its obligation for the 
aggregate unfunded liability of the plan. 
Hawaii’s state-administered pension plan illustrates the limitations of the 
disclosure requirements for cost-sharing plans. The Hawaii Employee 
Retirement System (ERS) administers a cost-sharing defined benefit plan for 
employees of “the State of Hawaii, City and County of Honolulu, and the 
counties of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai.”89 This 2009 CAFR for the plan as a 
whole disclosed that as of June 30, 2009, the ERS plan was 64.6% funded, 
with over $6 billion in unfunded pension obligations.90 Collectively, in 2009, 
the participating employers, including the state, contributed an amount equal 
to 109.9% of the ARC.91 
Even though the pension plan had over $6 billion in unfunded pension 
obligations at the end of 2009, neither that $6 billion figure nor even a 
 
 88. In 2012, GASB adopted significant changes to the reporting requirements. See infra Part VI. 
 89. EMPS.’ RET. SYS. OF THE STATE OF HAW., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 5 (2013), available at http://ers.ehawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/CAFR-2010-rev-2.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 66. 
 91. Id. 
A6_SHNITSER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2014  10:10 AM 
690 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:663 
portion of it ever appeared on any state, municipal, or county financial report. 
Indeed, in the 2009 Hawaii state CAFR, the state disclosed only the state’s 
ARC, and that the state contributed 100% of the ARC in each of the three 
prior years.92 What the state did not provide was any information regarding 
what percentage of the unfunded liability could be attributed to the state 
employees versus employees of participating cities and counties. In other 
words, the disclosure requirements for cost-sharing plans shrouded the source 
of the $6 billion of underfunding and the allocation of that liability among 
the numerous participating employers. In contrast, if Hawaii’s plan had been 
an agent multiple-employer plan, the Hawaii state CAFR would have had to 
provide information about the funding level for just the state’s portion. Each 
participating city and county would have had to do the same with respect to 
its own account.93 
The cost-sharing arrangements and the applicable reporting regime 
under GASB have thus obscured the magnitude of unfunded pension 
liabilities and shielded such liabilities from the scrutiny of investors lending 
money to indebted municipalities and states and from the participating 
employers themselves. Indeed, representatives of cost-sharing plans and the 
participating employers have argued that participating employers have no 
legal obligation to make contributions to the plan other than those required 
by statute, and that employees look solely to the plan, not to the employer, for 
payment of benefits. They have also stated that in many cases, the law does 
not clearly address the question of who is liable for the amount of 
 
 92. See EMPS.’ RET. SYS. OF THE STATE OF HAW., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2009, at 89 (2012), available at http://ers.ehawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/CAFR2009rev2.pdf. 
 93. For example, the State of Indiana contributes to the Public Employees’ Retirement 
Fund, an agent multiple-employer plan. The 2010 State CAFR discloses that as of July 1, 2009, 
“the state employees portion of the plan was 87 percent funded. The actuarial accrued liability 
for benefits was $2.4 billion, and the actuarial value of assets was $2.1 billion, resulting in an 
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) of $0.3 billion.” OFFICE OF IND. AUDITOR OF STATE, 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 104 
(2011), available at http://www.in.gov/auditor/files/Entire_2010_CAFR.pdf. The plan’s CAFR 
discloses that overall, the plan was 93.1% funded, with .9 billion in total unfunded  actuarial 
accrued liability. IND. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. FUND., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 56 (2010), available at http://www.in.gov/inprs/ 
files/PERFCAFR2010.pdf. Similarly, the 2012 CAFR for Colorado PERA, the administrator of 
several cost-sharing plans, explicitly acknowledges the relatively limited disclosure obligations 
imposed on employers in cost-sharing plans, noting that: 
[i]f the Division Trust Funds of PERA were single employer plans or an agent multi-
employer plan, [the cumulative net pension obligation], allocated to each employer, 
would need to be reported as a liability on the employers’ financial statements. As 
the employers are part of a cost-sharing multi-employer plan, they . . . only record a 
liability if they have not paid the statutorily required contribution rate. 
COLO. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. ASS’N, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 2012, at 35 (2013), available at https://www.copera.org/pdf/5/5-20-12.pdf. 
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underfunding should plan assets be insufficient to pay liabilities; such a 
scenario would “undoubtedly generate complex litigation.”94 
Therefore, relative to the cost-sharing arrangement, both the agent 
multiple and the single-employer arrangements are expected to be associated 
with better funding discipline. For each participating employer, the latter has 
provided a measure of the liabilities and the available assets for the pension 
benefits of its own employees, thus enabling better planning with respect to 
future benefits and current uses of employer revenues. Furthermore, as a 
result of the greater disclosure requirements under GASB guidelines, an 
employer participating in a single-employer or agent plan (but not in a cost-
sharing plan) has had to disclose any unfunded liabilities attributed to that 
employer to plan participants, taxpayers, and investors. Such greater 
transparency and ease of monitoring can be expected to promote annual 
contributions that more closely track the GASB-recommended ARC amounts. 
IV. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
A. DATA 
This Article combines 2001–2010 data provided by the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College (“CRR”),95 with original data 
collected and coded by the author. The frequently cited CRR Public Plans 
Dataset (“PPD”)96 contains certain financial, governance, and plan design 
information for 126 state and local defined benefit plans.97 Of those 126 
plans, the PPD covers 107 state-administered plans, which represent more 
than 90% of all state government pension assets and members.98 The other 
19 plans in the PPD are locally administered plans (such as the plan for the 
city of Austin or the plan for Houston firefighters).99 
Although many analyses cite averages from all 126 plans in the PPD, this 
Article distinguishes between state-administered plans and non-state-
administered plans (i.e., plans administered by and covering the employees 
 
 94. Letter from the Employer Cost-Sharing Coalition to Michelle Czerkawski, GASB (Dec. 
27, 2011). The Coalition is “a group of cost-sharing plans and employers including California 
State Teachers’ Retirement System, the Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association, the 
Kentucky State Teachers’ Retirement System, the Nevada Public Employees’ Retirement System, 
Ohio Public Employees’ Retirement System, and the University of Colorado.” Id. 
 95. Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., State and Local Defined Benefit Plans, PUB. PLANS 
DATABASE, http://nianticsystems.com/pls/apex/f?p=1988:20:0::NO:RP (last visited Oct. 31, 
2014) (follow hyperlink for dataset; the CRR dataset downloaded for this Article is on file with 
the author). 
 96. See, e.g., GOKHALE, supra note 16; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 
2; Robert K. Triest & Bo Zhao, The Role of Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Shocks in the Evolution of 
Public Sector Pension Funding 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 13-26, 2013), 
available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2013/wp1326.pdf. 
 97. Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., supra note 95. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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of a single municipality, county, or special district). As plans administered by 
individual cities, counties, or special districts are different from plans created 
by state statute and administered by state-level entities, this Article excludes 
the 19 locally administered plans in the PPD dataset, as well as the California 
and Illinois university plans, leaving 105 state-administered plans. A review of 
each individual plan in the PPD reveals that the 105 state-administered plans 
include plans covering only state employees, plans covering both state and 
local employees, and plans covering only local employees. Based on data 
reported by Peng100 and on the author’s review of state financial reports, data 
on five additional state-administered plans for local employees is added to the 
PPD,101 resulting in a dataset that covers 110 state-administered plans over the 
ten-year period between 2001 and 2010. 
B. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
The focus of the regression analysis in this Article is on funding 
discipline, which is approximated by the percentage of the ARC contributed 
to each plan in a given year. In the panel dataset, the percentage of ARC 
contributed ranges from 0 to 485.7, with a mean of 92.0 and a standard 
deviation of 33.44.102 With the percentage of ARC contributed in each plan-
year as the dependent variable, the regression analysis tests the hypotheses 
associated with each of the independent variables described below. Summary 
statistics for these variables are presented in Table B2. 
Actuarial Determination: Based on extensive review of state statutes and 
state legislation over the 2001–2010 period, the variable “Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination” is hand coded for each plan-year as 1 if the 
applicable statute provides that the employer contribution is determined by 
an actuarial valuation and there are no ceilings, caps, or limitations on the 
contribution. The variable is coded as 0 if the employer contribution rate is 
set by statute (for example, providing that the employer contribution in a 
 
 100. Peng observes: 
With regard to local employee coverage, there are 37 states that offer the same 
pension plan to both state employees and local employees and the plan is managed 
by a state-level retirement system. In 12 states where state pension plans do not cover 
local employees, there is a statewide pension plan or municipal retirement system 
for just local governments. Massachusetts is the only state that does not have either 
a state pension plan for local employees or a state-level municipal retirement system. 
PENG, supra note 10, at 16. Of the systems identified by Peng (and accordingly, the relevant plans 
administered by each system), all but the following are included in the final dataset used in this 
Article: Georgia Municipal Employee Benefit System (which provides only administrative support 
for local plans); Louisiana Municipal Employees Retirement System (for which the relevant data 
was not available), and the Vermont Municipal Employees Retirement System (for which the 
relevant data was not available). 
 101. The five plans are: Connecticut Municipal, Delaware County and Municipal (Police), 
Delaware County and Municipal (Other), Mississippi Municipal, and Pennsylvania Municipal. 
 102. One outlier point is excluded as it is likely the result of a coding error. 
A6_SHNITSER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2014  10:10 AM 
2015] FUNDING DISCIPLINE FOR U.S. PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 693 
given year shall equal a set percentage of creditable compensation), or, if 
there are any caps, limits, or mandatory transfers imposed on actuarial 
determinations. For example, if the statute provides that the employer 
contribution shall be determined by an actuarial valuation, but then states 
that the annual contribution cannot exceed 12% of creditable compensation, 
the variable “Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination” is coded as 0 for 
that plan. “Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination” is coded as 1 if the 
statute provides for actuarial determination, but the legislature in a given year 
overrides the statute without permanently changing it. Under an alternative 
specification, the variable “Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination (No 
Leg. Override),” is coded as 0 in cases where there is a legislative override of 
the statute in a given year, as though the contribution rate were set by statute 
in that year. In the plan-year sample analyzed in this Article, the actuarial 
method is used approximately 58% of the time, or 50% if legislative overrides 
are treated as “statutory” determinations for a given year. 
Liability Sharing: A set of dummy variables tracks whether the plan is 
coded in the PPD as a single-employer plan, an agent multiple-employer plan, 
or a cost-sharing multiple-employer plan. For purposes of the regression 
analysis, the variable “Agent or Single-Employer Plan” is coded as 1 for any 
plan that is an agent multiple-employer or single-employer plan, and as 0 for 
any cost-sharing multiple-employer plan. Approximately 26% of all plans in 
the sample are plans that are either single-employer or agent multiple-
employer plans. 
Employer Composition: To measure the impact of employer 
composition, the variable “Local Employers Only” tracks whether the plan 
includes the state as an employer. The variable is hand coded by the author 
as 1 if the state is not an employer and as 0 otherwise. Plans coded as 1 are 
thus state-administered plans that include only municipal-level employers 
(i.e., the plan is administered at the state level but no state-level employers 
participate). Plans coded as 0 include plans comprised of both state and 
municipal employers and plans comprised of just state employers. 
Approximately 18% of all plans in the sample are plans in which only 
municipal-level employers participate. 
Enforcement Provisions: Based on statutory review by the author, the 
variable “Statutory Withholding Provision” is coded as 1 if the relevant statutes 
provide for some means of withholding funds otherwise due to an employer 
if such an employer fails to make the required contribution to the pension 
plan. Approximately 34% of the observations in the sample are coded as 1 
and all such observations are plans that include municipal employers (i.e., 
plans where the state is the sole employer tend not to have such enforcement 
provisions). 
Constitutional Provisions: The variable “Constitutional Provision for 
Actuarial Funding” is coded as 1 by the author if the state constitution 
includes requirements for sound or adequate funding of the state pension 
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plans. Data is coded based on information initially provided by the National 
Education Association survey and verified by the author.103 A total of 26 out 
of 110 plans are coded as being subject to a constitutional funding provision. 
Board Composition: Based on a review of relevant statutory provisions 
and plan reports, the variable “Ex Officio Members on Board” tracks the 
percent of voting board members who are members by virtue of the political 
office that they hold (i.e., state treasurer, director of administration, etc.). The 
median is 16.6% and the 75th percentile is 30.7%. For certain regression 
specifications, a binary variable is coded as 1 if more than 30% of the voting 
board members are ex officio members. 
In addition to the six institutional variables described above, the 
regression analysis considers also the impact of fiscal stress and 
macroeconomics conditions. Fiscal stress is measured by the total state and 
municipal debt as a percentage of Gross State Product (“GSP”).104 Prior 
studies show that fiscal stress is associated with decreases in pension 
funding,105 presumably because public employers respond to budgetary 
pressure by, whenever possible under the particular institutional regime, 
decreasing contributions to the pension plans. In addition, year-fixed effects 
are included to take into account the U.S. macroeconomic conditions and 
trends throughout the 2001–2010 period that broadly affected the asset 
portfolios of all public pension plans. 
The analysis presented below is based on observational data and 
consequently reflects the limitations of an approach based on such data. 
While it would be ideal to randomly assign different institutional mechanisms 
to plans and compare subsequent performance, such an approach is simply 
not feasible in practice. Since institutions are not randomly assigned to plans, 
one must consider endogeneity as a possible concern and, specifically, the 
possibility that the selection of statutory and legal constraints is itself a 
reflection of a plan sponsor’s commitment (or lack thereof) to funding 
discipline. In evaluating this potential concern, it is helpful to remember that 
 
 103. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, NEA ISSUE BRIEF ON PENSION PROTECTIONS IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 17–22 (2004), available at http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/PensionProtections 
inStateConstitutions04.pdf. 
 104. State and local governments increase borrowing as one means of coping with gaps 
between expenditures and revenues. See, e.g., STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT: AN ANALYSIS 1 (2011) (noting that state and local 
governments have used a “combination of rainy day fund withdrawals, tax increases, spending 
reductions, and in some instances, borrowing to meet these balanced budget requirements”). In 
this Article, data for this debt variable is calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau State 
& Local Government Finance statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis for all but the 2001 
and 2003 periods, for which debt data is not available from the U.S. Census Bureau on a state-by-
state basis. For those years, estimates are taken from Christopher Chantrill, Government Spending 
in the U.S., USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM, http://usgovernmentspending.com (last visited Oct. 
31, 2014. 
 105. See, e.g., MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 42, at 4–5; see also Mitchell & Smith, supra note 37, 
at 278, 288. 
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much of the public pension infrastructure—including the creation of single- 
and multiple-employer plans, the rate determination methodologies, the 
withholding provisions, and the inclusion of local employers—was put in 
place well before the start of the century. Once put in place, the institutional 
features analyzed in this Article have remained quite constant, particularly 
over the last decade (and likely over much longer periods). Therefore, each 
set of decision-makers has generally come into an institutional framework that 
is itself quite sticky. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to consider the 
institutional features discussed above as independent regressors. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. RESULTS 
The results discussed below provide empirical support for the hypothesis 
that commitment and transparency promoting institutions play a significant 
role in pension funding discipline. For a rough cut of the data, Table 4 first 
sets forth the correlation between the dependent and independent variables. 
The correlation values between the percentage of ARC contributed and each 




 106. The correlation matrix reveals that there are positive correlations between certain types 
of institutional features, which may suggest that certain types of institutions come in packages. 
See infra Table 4. However, tests for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factors confirm 
that none of the predictors are highly collinear. 
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Table 5 presents the core results of the regression analysis. Panel A uses 
the first specification of “Statute Provides for Actuarial Determination,” which 
looks only at the statutory language to determine whether or not the employer 
contribution rate is determined actuarially or is fixed in statute, regardless of 
any legislative overrides in a particular year that alter the contribution rates 
without permanently changing the relevant statutory provision. Panel B uses 
the alternate specification, whereby the employer rate is only coded as being 
determined actuarially if the statute provides for such determination and if 
there is no legislative interference in that year. 
 
Table 5. Institutional Features and Plan Funding Discipline 2001–2010 
This table presents the results of a series of pooled OLS regressions of 
institutional variables of interest on plan funding discipline, as measured by 
the percentage of ARC contributed in a given year. The regressions include 
year dummies (not shown) and a measure of state and local debt as a 
percentage of GSP in the year preceding the reporting year. Standard errors 
are clustered by state and by year. Panels A and B analyze the same variables, 
with the exception of the variable tracking the statutory provisions for setting 
the annual employer contribution. Under the coding methodology used in 
Panel A, a plan is coded as having actuarial determination if the relevant 
pension statute so provides. The coding methodology used in Panel B 
incorporates a further search of state statutes and legislation to identify cases 
where there is a temporary legislative override of the actuarial requirement in 
a given year. In cases where the legislature overrides an actuarial requirement, 
the plan is treated as having a statutorily set (rather than actuarially 
determined) rate for that year. 
 
Panel A 
 Dep. Var. = Percent of ARC Contributed 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Statute Provides 
Actuarial Determination 
10.28** 9.676** 10.04*** 9.924** 11.17*** 10.51*** 
(4.011) (3.990) (3.723) (3.887) (3.758) (3.410) 
Agent or Single- 
Employer Plan 
8.150** 7.225* 8.680** 7.317** 7.650** 6.753* 
(3.940) (3.863) (3.944) (3.721) (3.691) (3.568) 
Local Employers Only 
 5.402*    4.059 
 (2.870)    (2.995) 
Statutory Withholding 
Provision 
  6.908   5.497 
  (4.482)   (4.251) 
Const. Provision for 
Actuarial Funding 
   5.488*  4.675 
   (3.293)  (3.320) 
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Ex Officio Members on 
Board (over 30%) 
    -8.355 -6.911 
    (5.662) (5.365) 
Debt as Percentage of 
GSP in Prior Year 
-0.827* -0.802* -0.668 -0.777* -0.699* -0.534 
(0.467) (0.479) (0.413) (0.459) (0.399) (0.375) 
Constant 
112.9*** 112.2*** 108.2*** 111.3*** 112.5*** 106.9*** 
(10.42) (10.60) (9.891) (10.07) (9.582) (9.711) 
Observations 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 
R-squared 0.085 0.088 0.094 0.090 0.096 0.108 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
 
Panel B 
 Dep. Var. = Percent of ARC Contributed 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination 
(No Leg. Override) 
13.51*** 12.95*** 13.02*** 13.14*** 13.96*** 12.73*** 
(4.384) (4.271) (4.085) (4.238) (4.401) (3.949) 
Agent or Single- 
Employer Plan 
6.839* 6.143* 7.374** 6.106* 6.469* 5.777* 
(3.517) (3.526) (3.555) (3.449) (3.421) (3.446) 
Local Employers Only 
 4.348*    3.394 
 (2.635)    (2.728) 
Statutory Withholding 
Provision 
  6.124   4.939 
  (4.138)   (4.076) 
Const. Provision for 
Actuarial Funding 
   5.030*  4.396 
   (2.964)  (3.075) 
Ex Officio Members on 
Board (over 30%) 
    -6.967 -5.812 
    (4.968) (4.874) 
Debt as Percentage of 
GSP in Prior Year 
-0.689 -0.676 -0.551 -0.648 -0.564 -0.428 
(0.420) (0.435) (0.386) (0.417) (0.349) (0.342) 
Constant 
110.1*** 109.6*** 106.1*** 108.7*** 110.0*** 105.1*** 
(8.149) (8.479) (8.314) (8.085) (7.552) (8.527) 
Observations 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 
R-squared 0.102 0.104 0.109 0.106 0.110 0.120 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
 
Each set of regression results supports the hypothesis that when it comes 
to pension funding discipline, institutional constraints matter. Two 
institutional features are consistently associated with better pension funding 
discipline. First, actuarial (rather than statutory) determination of employer 
contribution rates, under either specification of this institutional feature, has 
a positive and significant impact on pension funding discipline. Second, 
transparency and accountability—as proxied through plans organized and 
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accounted for as single-employer or agent multiple-employer plans—is also 
positively and significantly associated with better pension funding discipline. 
Other institutional features—such as the separation of plan funding and 
plan management, constitutional provisions for actuarial plan funding, and 
statutory provisions for withholding of funds from delinquent employers—
matter as well, and the direction of impact is entirely consistent with the 
hypotheses in Part III. In the sample used in this analysis, however, the positive 
coefficients on these variables are not consistently significant at the .10 level. 
In the case of the constitutional and withholding provisions, the ease of 
enforcement may be a limiting factor. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests, for 
example, that constitutional references to “actuarially sound” funding 
standards do not create sufficiently clear requirements.107 Further analysis of 
a larger sample may be necessary to confirm the impact of these institutional 
features and to tease out their interactions with one another.108 
As predicted, the impact of greater involvement by ex officio board 
members is consistently negative, though the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The difficulty of quantifying the influence of such members is 
likely a partial culprit for the lack of statistical significance. First, the power 
afforded to board members in general varies greatly and, as discussed above, 
is often constrained by either the actuarial or legislative primacy with respect 
to funding decisions. Second, a binary cutoff for participation above a certain 
threshold may not capture the highly context-specific influence of ex officio 
members. In certain cases, one powerful ex officio member may be able to 
strongly influence the board, the governor, or the legislature; in other cases, 
several ex officio members may defer to the preferences of other board 
members. The use of a continuous measure for the percent of ex officio board 
members, however, likewise yields a negative but insignificant coefficient. 
Still, the results demonstrate the need for further investigation of the conflicts 
of interest that plague ex officio and other appointed board members, and of 
the potential of fiduciary laws to mitigate such conflicts.109 
Finally, although the impact of prior year debt-to-GSP ratio is negative, 
the coefficient is only weakly significant. The coefficients on many of the year 
dummy variables (with 2001 as the baseline) are negative and significant, 
 
 107. See Monahan, supra note 87, at 5 (suggesting that “[a] primary weakness in these 
constitutional funding requirements is that there is no generally accepted standard for funding 
a pension on an ‘actuarially sound’ basis, and the constitutional language does not define the 
funding requirement any further”). 
 108. For example, some of the disciplining effects of the enforcement provisions for state-
administered plans with only municipal employers may be picked up by the dummy variable that 
isolates such plans in order to assess the impact of the separation of funding and management. 
Notably, in plans that include both the state and local entities as employers, the mean percentage 
of ARC contributed is 96.00% when there is a withholding provision and 87.75% otherwise. 
 109. For example, the entire seven-member Retirement Board of the Nevada Public 
Employees Retirement System is appointed by the governor. NEV. REV. STAT. § 286.120 (2013) 
(in effect in 2010). 
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suggesting that year dummies may pick up some of the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions otherwise picked up by the fiscal stress variable. 
When year dummy variables are excluded, the coefficients on the debt 
variable are negative and significant at the traditional thresholds. 
B. CONTROLS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The results in this analysis are robust to a number of model and data 
specifications. With respect to the data, Tables B1, B2, and B3 of Appendix B 
assess the robustness of the results with respect to particular plans in the 
sample. First, Tables B1 and B2 consider the impact of removing the five plans 
in the sample that are considered “closed” to new employees.110 Although the 
liabilities for such plans have to be funded in the same way as liabilities for 
open plans, to the extent that such plans represent more clearly contained 
and less politically salient liabilities, it is possible that the institutional 
constraints considered in this analysis affect closed and open plans differently. 
Table B1 compares the summary statistics for the full sample and for the 
sample excluding closed plans. Table B2 presents the key analyses shown in 
Table 5 of this Part, but with a sample that now includes 105 unique plans 
instead of the 110 in the full sample. The results for the two key institutional 
variables are generally consistent with the results generated by the full sample, 
though statistical significance decreases with a smaller sample. Coefficients on 
the other institutional regressors are directionally consistent with the 
hypotheses in this Article, but are not consistently significant at the .10 level. 
Tables B1 and B3 consider whether the results are robust to plan size. 
Given the variation in state size and population density, certain plans in the 
sample are much larger than others. One indicator of approximate plan size 
is the actuarial value of the assets set aside to fund the plan benefits. Table B1 
compares the summary statistics for the full sample and for the sample 
excluding the smallest and the largest 10% of plans by the actuarial value of 
the assets. Table B3 presents the key analyses shown in Table 5 but with the 
value of the assets added as a control, and also using smaller subsamples of 
either 97 plans (excluding the smallest and largest 10%) or 87 plans 
(excluding the smallest 25%). Neither adding asset size as a control, nor 
selecting subsamples based on plan size changes the key findings: the 
coefficient on actuarial determination of employer contributions remains 
 
 110. The five “closed” plans include: the Alaska Public Employees Plan (after 2005), see STATE 
OF ALASKA, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR JULY 1, 2009–JUNE 30, 
2010, at 109 (n.d.), available at http://doa.alaska.gov/dof/reports/resource/fy10/2010cafr.pdf; 
Alaska Teachers Plan (after 2005), see id. at 110; Mississippi Municipal Retirement Plan, see MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 21-29-17(d) (1999) (in effect in 2010); Washington Teachers Plan I, see STATE OF 
WASH., OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 118 (2010), available at http://www.ofm.wa.gov/cafr/2010/CAFR10.pdf; 
Washington Public Employees Plan I, see id. at 115; and the Washington Law Enforcement Officers 
and Fire Fighters Plan I, see id. at 122. 
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positive and statistically significant; the coefficient on the single employer/
agent structure remains positive and significant in all but the one specification 
that analyzes a subsample of 87 plans and includes all of the independent 
regressors at once. The coefficients on the remaining institutional variables 
are directionally consistent but not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
To ensure that results are not driven by the cases in which annual 
contributions are either close to zero or exceed 100% of the ARC,111 Table 
B4 presents a probit analysis of the model in which the dependent variable is 
coded as 1 if, in a given year, the contribution to the plan is at least 90% of 
the ARC benchmark, and as 0 if it is below the 90% threshold. Under this 
specification, 69% of the observations are coded as 1 and 31% are coded as 
0. The results are consistent with the key findings from Table 5. In addition, 
under this specification, statutory provisions for the withholding of funds 
from delinquent employers are positively and significantly associated with the 
likelihood of making a contribution that equals or exceeds 90% of the ARC, 
suggesting that although this variable may not be associated with small 
changes in annual contributions, it does have explanatory power in 
distinguishing plans that receive the bulk of their ARCs and those that do not. 
Finally, because funding discipline is measured by the percentage of the 
GASB recommended ARC contributed in a given year, it is important to 
consider the limitations of this measure. As noted in Part II, the percentage 
of ARC contributed is not a perfect measure because GASB has permitted 
certain variations in the inputs and assumptions used to calculate the ARC, 
some of which may be strategically selected to decrease the “required” 
contributions under the GASB guidelines.112 While it is not feasible to 
completely standardize each plan’s yearly ARC calculation, it is worth 
considering whether certain inputs into the ARC calculation are correlated 
with the institutional variables of interest. For example, do plans that rely on 
actuarial determination of the employer contribution rate also use longer 
amortization periods to decrease the required ARC payments—and thus give 
 
 111. A contribution may exceed 100% of the ARC either because statutory provisions 
mandate contributions in excess of the ARC amount, or because the calculations for the 
percentage of ARC contributed were based on actuarial data that is more recent than the data 
used to determine the employer contribution amounts, which, for certain plans, are set several 
years in advance. GASB, however, requires that financial reports be based on the results of an 
actuarial valuation that is performed not more than two years before the plan’s reporting date 
for that year. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS SERIES: STATEMENT NO. 25, at 15 (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/ 
GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1176160042391#gasbs25.pdf. 
 112. It is worth reiterating that GASB cannot require plan sponsors to actually make any 
contributions; during the time period analyzed in this Article, its standards merely required the 
calculation of the “annually required contribution” using a set of parameters set forth in GASB 
guidelines. 
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the impression of better funding discipline?113 Do such plans have longer 
smoothing periods for purposes of asset valuation so that investment gains 
and losses are recognized over longer periods?114 
Table 6 presents an analysis of the correlations between the reported 
amortization and smoothing periods, and the institutional variables of 
interest.115 The results for the amortization period suggest that while certain 
institutional features appear to be correlated with the amortization period, 
the correlation is generally negative, such that plans with these features 
actually use shorter amortization periods. 
The results for the smoothing period are more mixed. In the absence of 
any strict requirements or limitations from GASB, the variety of smoothing 
techniques complicates direct comparison across plans, and the assessment 
depends on the coding methodology selected.116 However, based on either 
 
 113. In considering the amortization period, it is important to distinguish between the 
amortization period used for purposes of the GASB ARC calculation, which must be less than 30 
years after 2006, and the remaining amortization period under the funding policy of any given 
plan. Indeed, several plans in the sample report at various times that under the funding 
methodology in effect during the reporting period, the amortization period is much longer than 
the 30 years permitted by the GASB standards. Other plans report amortization periods that are 
shorter than the permitted 30 years. 
 114. Pursuant to GASB Statement 25, GASB has not placed constraints on the kinds of 
smoothing techniques or the length of smoothing periods used in the actuarial valuation of assets. 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 111. Therefore, different systems 
calculate the actuarial (rather than the market) value of their plan assets differently. Some 
systems do not incorporate smoothing techniques and simply take the market value as the 
actuarial value of assets, while others use fairly straightforward smoothing approaches. For 
example, the Missouri Public Schools Retirement System uses an asset-smoothing method by 
which investment returns above or below 8% are recognized over a five-year period. See PUB. SCH. 
& EDUC. EMP. RET. SYS. OF MO., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 9 (2010), available at https://ia600705.us.archive.org/32/items/ 
2010PSRSCAFR/2010PSRSCAFR.pdf. Other systems use a fixed multi-year smoothing approach 
but impose a “corridor” that limits the amount by which the market and actuarial values can 
diverge. See STATE TEACHERS RET. SYS. OF OHIO, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30, 2010, at 15 (2010), available at https://www.strsoh.org/ 
_pdfs/annualreports/cafrs/2010_cafr.pdf (“Market changes in investment assets are smoothed 
over a four-year period for valuation purposes, except that the actuarial value of assets shall not 
be less than 91% nor more than 109% of market value.”). Still others base the actuarial value on 
the expected rate of return, with an adjustment for market performance. See EMP. RET. SYS. OF TEX., 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 99 (2012) (“The actuarial value of assets is 
determined as the expected value of plan assets as of the valuation date plus 20% of the difference 
between the market-related value and the expected value. The expected value equals the actuarial 
value of plan assets as of the prior valuation date, plus contributions, less benefit payments and 
administrative expenses, all accumulated at the assumed rate of interest to the current valuation 
date.”).  
 115. Data is taken from the CRR PPD and from plan reports. Amortization period data is 
available for 992 plan-year data points; smoothing data is available for 1058 plan-year data points. 
 116. The significant variation in smoothing methods complicates the classification and 
quantification of such techniques. The CRR database includes a numeric value for the 
“smoothing period” used by the plans in its sample. This approach, however, may mask certain 
techniques used by plans to extend the smoothing period. For example, a number of plans that 
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the CRR methodology or an alternative coding approach,117 there is some 
indication that plans with actuarially determined contribution rates use 
longer smoothing periods—as do plans without state employers, plans with 
constitutional provisions for actuarial funding, and plans with greater 
numbers of ex officio board members. However, because longer smoothing 
periods typically delay the recognition of both investment gains and losses, 
the net impact of such longer periods on ARC calculations is not simply to 
reduce the ARC. The task for future research is both to assess the long-term 
impact of actuarial techniques on funding requirements and to identify the 
loci of decision-making over actuarial assumptions and methodologies across 
different plans. 
 








Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination 
-0.26 0.19 0.20 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination 
(No Leg. Override) 
-0.20 0.09 0.09 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Agent or Single- 
Employer Plan 
-0.04 -0.15 0.01 
(0.19) (0.00) (0.68) 
Local Employers Only 
-0.08 0.13 0.09 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Const. Provision for 
Actuarial Funding 
-0.07 0.08 0.07 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Statutory Withholding 
Provision 
-0.00 0.00 -0.13 
(0.98) (0.93) (0.00) 
Ex Officio Members on 
Board (over 30%) 
-0.09 0.25 0.23 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
 
are coded as having a “1 year” smoothing period employ a technique whereby the actuarial value 
of assets is determined as the expected value of plan assets plus 20% (or 33% or 10%) of the 
difference between the market-related value and the expected value. Insofar as only 20% of the 
difference between the market and the expected value is recognized in one year, this approach 
may, in effect, extend smoothing beyond one year. Furthermore, systems that choose to recognize 
20% of the difference between expected and market value should not necessarily be equated 
with those that choose to recognize 33% of the difference. 
 117. For comparison, under an alternative coding scheme, plans that are coded as having a 
one-year smoothing period in the CRR database but that take the smoothing approach described 
in supra note 114 are coded as having a smoothing period that corresponds to the percentage of 
the difference between expected and market returns that is recognized in each year. A plan that 
recognizes 20% of the difference is coded as having a five-year smoothing period. 
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
At a time when retirement security is at the forefront of the national 
political debate, and public pension reform a major agenda item in most 
states, this Article highlights the importance of the legal institutions that 
shape the infrastructure and governance of public pension plans. In contrast 
to prior research and policy recommendations, the focus is not on pension 
benefits promised or pension benefits to be taken away.118 Instead, taking 
each plan’s benefits as a given, this Article shows that certain features of 
institutional design help ensure that the benefits promised are actually 
funded. Knowing which institutions have promoted funding discipline in the 
past should inform the thinking about needed changes and new institutional 
designs. This Part shows how the findings of this Article offer a new lens 
through which to view and evaluate the recently enacted GASB reforms,119 the 
calls for federal regulation of state and local public pension plans, and the 
legislative proposals to bring single-employer local plans under state 
administration. 
A. 2012 GASB REFORMS 
In 2012, GASB adopted a series of reforms that represent a major 
departure from prior practice. In addition to changing how plan liabilities are 
to be discounted,120 the new guidelines change the way that each employer’s 
 
 118. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
837, 870, 871–72 (2009) (stating that “most state and local governments will want to increase 
the age and service requirements for pension benefits, and many will want to increase employee 
contributions,” and recommending a shift to cash balance plans). In a related vein, the closely 
watched Detroit bankruptcy, and the proposed reorganization plan, involved scaling back of 
pension benefits to retirees and current employees. See Alana Semuels, Detroit Bankruptcy Plan 
Includes Deep Pension Cuts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-detroit-bankruptcy-20140222-story.html. The approved reorganization plan 
included smaller-than-anticipated cuts to the benefits of retirees due to state and foundation 
contributions to shore up the pension system. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Plan to 
Exit Bankruptcy Is Approved for Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, at A11. Fundamentally, however, 
municipal bankruptcy can provide some immediate debt relief for a distressed city, but it cannot, 
by its very nature, impose structural changes or long-term institutional reforms to promote 
funding discipline. See generally Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy, in 
WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN 
FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012). 
 119. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
SERIES: STATEMENT NO. 67 (2012), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASB 
DocumentPage?cid=1176160220594&acceptedDisclaimer=true; GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SERIES: STATEMENT NO. 68 (2012), available 
at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=1176160220621& 
acceptedDisclaimer=true. 
 120. In June 2012, GASB revised its guidance for discounting pension liabilities. Starting with 
the 2015 fiscal year, the expected rate of return may be applied only to liabilities that will be 
covered by the plan’s net position and projected contributions; for the remaining liabilities, the 
municipal borrowing rate for a 20-year general obligation bond must be used. See  
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prior funding history and share of liabilities are to be reported after 2014.121 
The ARC measure is eliminated, and with it, an important benchmark for 
comparing funding discipline across plans. While GASB took a step in the 
right direction by requiring all plan sponsors to use the same actuarial cost 
method for determining annual pension costs, it took a step in the wrong 
direction by no longer requiring plans to report pension contributions 
relative to a benchmark measure. Instead, plans will have to report, for a 
period of the ten most recent fiscal years, either their actuarially determined 
contribution amount, if applicable, or the statutorily required contribution 
amount.122 Those that report an actuarially determined contribution amount 
will have to provide information about the underlying actuarial assumptions 
and methods used in the calculation.123 Notably, plans with statutorily set 
employer rates will not be required to report actuarially determined 
contribution amounts for comparison.124 This change will make future studies 
of funding discipline far more difficult and will obscure funding discipline in 
plans whose sponsors make contributions based on statutorily set rates. 
Though such statutorily set rates could be considered grossly inadequate 
relative to a 30-year amortization benchmark, the new guidelines no longer 
require such comparisons. As Alicia Munnell of the Center for Retirement 
Research has observed, the new rules produce “a tempting escape valve that 
states could use as ARCs rise beyond reach: introduce a statutory rate and 
dispense with reporting actuarial calculations.”125 
While obscuring funding discipline, the new GASB rules should shed 
light on each employer’s share of a plan’s unfunded liabilities. The new rules 
limit the masking of liabilities that GASB had previously permitted for cost-
sharing multiple-employer plans, whereby significant unfunded liabilities of 
cost-sharing plans were never attributed to or reported by any of the 
participating employers. Under the new rules, an employer that participates 
 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS TO BRING ABOUT 
MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING (2013), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/ 
GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage&cid=1176160140567. For a general discussion of 
the impact of this change, see, for example, Caitlin Kenney, Public Pensions Are About to Look Less 
Healthy, PLANET MONEY (July 20, 2012, 3:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/ 
07/20/157060335/public-pensions-are-about-to-look-less-healthy. 
 121. GASB Statement 67, “Financial Reporting for Pension Plans”—an amendment of GASB 
Statement No. 25—is effective for financial statements for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 
2013. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 67, supra note 119, at v. 
GASB Statement No. 68, “Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions”—an amendment of 
GASB Statement No. 27—is effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2014. 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 68, supra note 119, at ix. 
 122. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 68, supra note 119, at v–vi. 
 123. Id. at 98. 
 124. Id. at 164. 
 125. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., HOW WOULD GASB 
PROPOSALS AFFECT STATE AND LOCAL PENSION REPORTING? 6–7 (2012), available at 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wp_2012-17-508.pdf.  
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in a cost-sharing plan will be required to recognize a liability for its 
proportionate share of the collective net pension liability. An employer’s 
proportion is to be determined on a basis that “is consistent with the manner 
in which contributions to the pension plan are determined.”126 GASB 
encourages “[t]he use of the employer’s projected long-term contribution 
effort as compared to the total projected long-term contribution effort of all 
employers as the basis for determining an employer’s proportion.”127 In 
addition, each employer’s pension liability, regardless of the plan type, will 
now have to be included on the employer’s balance sheet, which should 
provide a clearer picture of the size of the pension liabilities relative to the 
resources of the particular public employer. 
The results presented in this Article suggest that any requirements that 
improve transparency and accountability with respect to individual employer 
liability—as single employer or agent multiple-employer arrangements have 
done under current GASB rules—can be expected to have a positive effect on 
funding discipline. However, eliminating the benchmark ARC measure may 
undermine the positive effect of improved transparency under the new GASB 
rules. Because the intricacies of pension accounting are not widely accessible, 
the new GASB rules may create only an illusion of transparency. Huge 
unfunded liabilities may become easier to see, but the employer’s efforts to 
pay down those liabilities will become much harder to evaluate for taxpayers, 
investors, and scholars. 
B. STATE-LEVEL SOLUTIONS 
Certain proponents of pension reform have proposed binding federal 
law—including “ERISA-style” funding requirements on the theory that “[i]f 
state lawmakers knew that pension promises had to be honored and, more 
important, had to be funded, they would be less likely to make irresponsible 
promises.”128 Although the sentiment is certainly apt, binding federal law 
should not be viewed as the only viable solution to the pension-funding crisis. 
Not only would a federal solution face strong resistance and constitutional 
challenges from the states, it would also eliminate the benefits of state-level 
innovation and regulatory experimentation that is currently taking place. 
Although ERISA has imposed funding discipline on defined benefit plans, few 
such plans remain. The effectiveness of ERISA as a long-term solution for 
 
 126. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 68, supra note 119, at vi. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Josh Barro, How Congress Can Help State Pension Reform, 2012 NAT’L AFF. 92, 102 
(2012), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20120619_Barro_indiv.pdf; see also 
Roger Lowenstein, The Long, Sorry Tale of Pension Promises, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2013), http:// 
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323308504579085220604114220. (“Before 
we get more Detroits, or more Studebakers, the federal government should enact an ERISA (with 
teeth) for public employers.”). 
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funding defined pension plans—rather than as a catalyst for terminating such 
plans—is not at all clear. 
Less drastic changes to state-level institutions may be a more viable 
option, and indeed various states have already developed innovative 
institutions to promote funding discipline within the context of their specific 
public pension arrangements.129 The focus of such state-level institutional 
reforms should be on greater independence for pension systems from plan 
sponsors, particularly with respect to the determination of employer 
contribution rates and related funding issues. This Article has shown that plan 
sponsor involvement—whether through legislated employer contribution 
rates or through control of pension boards—has been associated with poorer 
funding discipline. By contrast, commitment mechanisms, such as those 
effected through statutory withholding provisions or constitutional 
amendments providing for sound actuarial funding of state pension systems, 
have been associated with better funding discipline and should be considered 
seriously by concerned legislators and citizens of the states that do not 
currently have such provisions. In states that do have such provisions, 
legislative attention should be devoted to the clarity and enforceability of such 
commitment mechanisms, particularly in light of the elimination of the ARC 
benchmark. 
C. STATE ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL PLANS 
The relative success, as measured by funding discipline, of plans 
consisting only of local employers has long-term implications for the structure 
of municipal pensions. Indeed, as noted earlier, the U.S. Census Bureau 
identifies over 3000 separate pension plans in the United States. The vast 
majority of these plans are local plans administered by municipalities and 
special districts. Each local system incurs its own administrative costs, and each 
misses out on the benefits of the bargaining power enjoyed by larger plans 
with respect to investments and service providers. More importantly, each 
municipality is left to both administer and fund the system, often without 
oversight from state government.130 Although further empirical analysis is 
 
 129. In Louisiana in 2011, for example, voters approved a constitutional amendment that, 
in addition to previously adopted constitutional requirements to fund the retirement plans in an 
actuarially sound manner, requires further that in fiscal years 2013–2014 and 2014–2015, 5% of 
money designated in the official forecast as nonrecurring be applied toward the balance of the 
unfunded accrued liability which existed as of June 30, 1988, for the Louisiana State Employees’ 
Retirement System and the Teachers Retirement System of Louisiana. See LA. CONST. art. VII, 
§ 10(D), amended by 2011 La. Acts 2169 (Act. No. 422), approved Oct. 22, 2011. The newly 
adopted constitutional provision also requires that in Fiscal Year 2015–2016 and every fiscal year 
thereafter, 10% of such nonrecurring revenue be applied to such purposes. LA. CONST. art. VII, 
§ 10(D)(2)(b)(iii). 
 130. States are increasingly concerned about the funding status of independent local plans, 
and some are looking at means of imposing state oversight on such plans. For example, in 
Tennessee, The Public Employee Defined Benefit Financial Security Act of 2014 requires local 
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required, there is at least anecdotal evidence that municipalities that are part 
of state-administered systems exhibit better funding discipline.131 Thus, state 
and local legislators should consider adding municipalities that administer 
their own plans to existing state-administered agent plans, or creating new 
systems to administer, on an agent basis, the plans of local employers. As such 
plans would necessarily be added or modified through state statute, legislators 
should also consider simultaneously adding withholding provisions to 
facilitate pension funding discipline among local plans. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The recent focus on public pensions has revealed the serious funding 
challenges facing many public plans. Recent political solutions have focused 
largely on benefit cutbacks and increased employee contributions. Yet both 
the analyses of past performance and the proposed solutions for future 
reforms have overlooked structural differences among plans. This Article 
shows that institutions that promote transparency with respect to individual 
employer liability, limit the discretion of the legislature over pension fund 
contributions, and hold it accountable for sound funding are associated with 
 
governments and authorities that are not part of the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System 
to meet certain actuarial benchmarks. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-501–07 (Supp. 2014). The new 
law gives the state treasurer the power to withhold governments’ share of state revenue if the 
contributions are not met. Id. at 9-3-507(a); Press Release, Tenn. Dep’t of the Treasury, Governor 
Haslam Signs Landmark Local Government Pension Reform Bill into Law (May 28, 2014), 
available at http://treasury.tn.gov/PDFs/pension514.pdf; see also Margaret Newkirk, Memphis 
Pension Blues Foretold with Tennessee Bill: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 13, 2014, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-14/memphis-pension-blues-foretold-with-tennessee-
bill-muni-credit.html (noting that 13 of the 31 local plans to be subject to the new law “didn’t make 
their full contribution in 2012, . . . [paying] a combined $86.4 million less than was actuarially 
required”). 
 131. Although Rhode Island implemented major reforms to its state-administered plans in 
2011, state leaders have struggled to bring into line the state’s 36 locally administered plans, a 
few of which have contributed to actual or threatened municipal bankruptcies in Rhode Island. 
Gina M. Raimondo, Op-Ed, Next Up: Reforming Local Pension Plans, PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://www.treasury.ri.gov/documents/opinion-12-21-11.pdf. State Treasurer Gina Raimondo 
wrote that, “Collectively, the locally-administered plans have a reported unfunded liability of 
approximately $2.1 billion, and funding level of only 40 percent.” Id. She encouraged local and 
state leaders to consider bringing such local plans into the state system, arguing that “[t]his move 
would provide for uniform benefits across municipalities, pooling of assets managed by the state 
and a legal requirement for municipalities to make annual required contributions.” Id. Recent 
research on locally administered plans suggests, however, that despite negative press about such 
plans, they are nearly as well funded as state-administered plans. See generally MUNNELL ET AL., 
supra note 43. State-administered plans, however, vary in the nature of the plan sponsors. Some 
include only state-level employers, while others include both state and local employers. A third 
type includes only local employers. See supra Part III.A.1. For plans that include both state and 
local employers, the challenge is to allocate any underfunding, as well the funding patterns, 
among the different plan sponsors. More generally, the critical question is whether plans for local 
employers that are part of state-administered systems are better funded than similar plans that 
are administered at the local level, and whether the result is affected by the type of state-
administered plans included in the analysis. 
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more consistent funding of pension promises. Conversely, institutions that 
obscure liabilities from participating employers, investors, and taxpayers, and 
that permit the legislature to reduce or skip pension contributions without 
consequence, are associated with worse funding discipline and unfunded 
promises. Simply cutting back benefits for employees will not fix U.S. public 
pension plans. Meaningful long-term reform requires the understanding and 
evaluation of current pension systems and plans in light of the institutional 
characteristics highlighted in this Article, and of measures geared toward the 
disciplined funding of benefits promised to public employees.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A. Examples of State Pension Systems and Plans Selected to Show 
Variation in Design132 








administers a defined 
benefit plan. 
State employees, 











administers a defined 
benefit plan. 
State employees and 
employees of certain 






System administers a 
defined benefit plan. 
Massachusetts teachers 
and administrators 






Massachusetts does not have a state-administered plan for non-teacher 
employees of local governments, which explains in part why 
Massachusetts has over 100 separate pension plans within the state. 
Missouri135 
 
The Public School 
Retirement System 
administers two plans: 
Public School 
Retirement System of 
Missouri and the Public 
Education Employee 
Retirement System. 
Public school teachers 
and non-certificated 
public school personnel 
Each plan is a cost-
sharing, multiple-
employer plan; the 
funds of the two 
plans are managed 
simultaneously, 
but each retains 
title to its own 
investments and 
the assets of each 
plan are restricted 
for benefits to 
members of that 
plan. 




The SEP and the 
Judicial Plan are 
 
 132. For the number of plans in each state, see BECKER-MEDINA, supra note 9, at 34–39 and 
Survey of Public Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered Defined Benefit Data, U.S. Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/govs/retire/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
   133.     See generally STATE OF HAWAII, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 92 (2010), available at http://files.hawaii.gov/auditor/Reports/ 
2010_Audit/CAFR_2010.pdf. 
   134.  See generally MARTIN J. BENISON, STATE OF MASS., OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER, 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 109 
(2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/osc/docs/reports-audits/cafr/cafr-2010.pdf. 
   135.   See generally STATE OF MO., OFFICE OF ADMIN. DIV. OF ACCOUNTING, COMPREHENSIVE 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 59 (2011), available at 
http://content.oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/CAFR-2010.pdf; About Us, MO. LOC. GOV. EMPS. 
RETIREMENT SYS., http://www.molagers.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
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System administers a 
State Employees’ Plan 
(SEP) and a Judicial 
Plan. 








System administers a 








The Missouri Local 
Government 
Employees’ Retirement 
System administers a 






Local governments that do not participate in one of the state-
administered plans have individual plans that, together with the state-run 
plans, comprise Missouri’s 66 pension plans. 
 
APPENDIX B 
Table B1. Comparison of Summary Statistics 




and Largest 10% of 
Plans by Actuarial 
Assets 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Percent of ARC 
Contributed 
92.00 33.44 92.93 32.75 91.18 36.52 
Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination 
0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.50 
Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination 
(No Leg. Override) 
0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Agent or Single- 
Employer Plan 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 
Local Employers Only 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 
Const. Provision for 
Actuarial Funding 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 
Statutory Withholding 
Provision 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.46 
Ex Officio Members on 
Board (over 30%) 
0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.42 
Debt as Percentage GSP 
in Prior Year 16.36 3.85 16.25 3.86 16.33 3.89 
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Table B2. Institutional Features and Plan Funding Discipline 2001–2010, 
Excluding Closed Plans 
 
This table follows the methodology of Table 5 but excludes plans that are 
closed to new participants. The regressions also include year dummies (not 
shown) and a measure of state and local debt as a percentage of GSP in the 
year preceding the reporting year. Standard errors are clustered by state and 
by year. Models 1–4 use the specification of “Statute Provides for Actuarial 
Determination” as in Panel A of Table 5; Models 5–8 use the alternate 
specification described in Panel B of Table 5. 
 
 Dep. Var. = Percent of ARC Contributed 





12.01*** 11.66*** 11.71*** 11.72***   
  






6.456* 5.993* 6.983** 5.713* 5.866* 5.456* 6.395* 5.203 




 2.930  2.137  2.725  2.242 




  4.841 4.002   4.475 3.689 





   4.667    4.889 





    -3.768   -2.673 







    12.03*** 11.68*** 11.63*** 11.27*** 
    (3.940) (3.854) (3.628) (3.462) 
Debt as 
Percentage of 
GSP in Prior 
Year 
-0.593 -0.583 -0.495 -0.419 -0.455 -0.450 -0.368 -0.304 
(0.373) (0.381) (0.348) (0.336) (0.339) (0.347) (0.327) (0.318) 
Constant 
108.0*** 107.7*** 104.9*** 103.8*** 106.7*** 106.5*** 103.9*** 102.9*** 
(7.763) (8.004) (8.353) (8.521) (6.848) (7.104) (7.812) (8.146) 
Observations 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 1039 
R-squared 0.084 0.085 0.089 0.096 0.085 0.086 0.089 0.095 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
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Table B3. Institutional Features and Plan Funding Discipline 2001–2010, 
Controlling for Plan Size 
This table follows the methodology of Table 5 and Table B2 but controls 
for plan size. As in the other tables, the regressions include year dummies (not 
shown) and a measure of state and local debt as a percentage of GSP in the 
year preceding the reporting year. Standard errors are clustered by state and 
by year. Models 1 and 4 include the full panel sample but add actuarial assets 
as an independent variable. Models 2 and 5 exclude the smallest 10% and 
largest 10% of plans by actuarial asset values. Models 3 and 6 exclude the 
smallest 25% of plans by actuarial asset values. 
 
 Dep. Var. = Percent of ARC Contributed
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination  
10.86*** 11.79*** 10.51***    
(3.349) (3.629) (3.812)    
Agent or Single- 
Employer Plan 
7.421** 8.506** 10.01** 6.296* 7.073* 8.053 
(3.662) (4.183) (4.776) (3.525) (4.137) (4.904) 
Local Employers Only 
3.695 1.882 2.402 3.003 1.483 0.882 
(3.113) (3.276) (4.493) (2.641) (2.843) (3.549) 
Statutory Withholding 
Provision 
5.962 6.196 5.122 5.548 5.763 4.274 
(4.470) (5.056) (4.533) (4.355) (4.964) (4.359) 
Const. Provision for 
Actuarial Funding 
4.033 3.962 3.730 3.818 3.306 3.507 
(3.257) (3.720) (3.066) (2.925) (3.175) (2.863) 
Ex Officio Members on 
Board (over 30%) 
-7.087 -7.544 -4.294 -5.768 -6.057 -3.609 
(5.663) (6.555) (6.667) (5.121) (5.768) (6.366) 
Actuarial Assets 
-1.32e-08   -2.10e-08   
(4.81e-08)   (4.54e-08)   
Statute Provides for 
Actuarial Determination 
(No Leg. Override) 
   12.94*** 14.22*** 14.61*** 
   (3.760) (3.854) (3.861) 
Debt as Percentage of 
GSP in Prior Year 
-0.522 -0.638 -0.834* -0.408 -0.476 -0.694 
(0.366) (0.400) (0.479) (0.337) (0.367) (0.461) 
Constant 
106.2*** 108.8*** 104.0*** 104.5*** 106.5*** 101.3*** 
(9.913) (11.76) (10.77) (8.843) (10.34) (9.952) 
Observations 1078 864 809 1078 864 809 
R-squared 0.109 0.112 0.132 0.121 0.123 0.158 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
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Table B4. Likelihood That Plan Received at Least 90% of ARC 
This table presents a series of probit regressions using a binary 
dependent variable that indicates whether a plan in given year received at 
least 90% of the ARC benchmark. The regressions also include year dummies 
(not shown) and a measure of state and local debt as a percentage of GSP in 
the year preceding the reporting year. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
Models 1–4 use the specification of “Statute Provides for Actuarial 
Determination” as in Panel A of Table 5; Models 5–8 use the alternate 
specification described in Panel B of Table 5. 
 
 Binary Dep. Var. = 1 if ARC ≥90%, 0 Otherwise 





1.117*** 1.088*** 1.116*** 1.158***     
(0.256) (0.260) (0.243) (0.205)     
Agent or Single- 
Employer Plan 
0.716*** 0.674*** 0.761*** 0.673*** 0.630*** 0.604*** 0.664*** 0.584*** 




 0.301  0.248  0.191  0.158 





   0.269    0.292 




  0.482** 0.412*   0.425* 0.374* 





   -0.341    -0.212 







    1.573*** 1.553*** 1.556*** 1.557*** 
    (0.153) (0.157) (0.154) (0.142) 
Debt as 
Percentage of 
GSP in Prior 
Year 
-0.0649** -0.0634** -0.0541* -0.0458 -0.0547* -0.0536* -0.0441 -0.0373 
(0.0295) (0.0301) (0.0284) (0.0279) (0.0308) (0.0311) (0.0302) (0.0287) 
Constant 
1.708*** 1.667*** 1.394*** 1.300*** 1.583*** 1.554*** 1.303** 1.223** 
(0.547) (0.559) (0.532) (0.534) (0.577) (0.587) (0.579) (0.580) 
Observations 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 
R-squared 0.209 0.213 0.226 0.241 0.297 0.299 0.310 0.318 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
 
